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ZACCHINI 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, to Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S 
448, this case presents a conflict between the tort of "appropriation" or 
"right of publicity" privacy and the First Amendment rights of broadcasters. 
~------------------- -2. FACTS: Petr is a "human cannonball." His act, which 
was originated by his father and performed only by his family for 50 years, 
consists of being blasted from a cannon into a net 200 feet away. The 
In August 1972 petr was performing at a county fair in Burton, 
Ohio. His act was staged in a grandstand area for the pleasure of 
anyone attending the fair. There was no separate admission for petr's 
performance, and it is unclear whether petr received a percentage of the 
general gate receipts. 
One night a reporter for WEWS, resp's television station, 
1/ 
attended the fair.- Petr noticed the reporter's camera and asked him 
not to film the performance. The reporter complied, but returned the 
following day on orders from his producer and videotaped the entire -
performance. WEWS broadcast the act on its e~veno'clock news program 
that night, accompanied by commentary describing the act as a "true 
spectator sport . . • a thriller" and "you really need to see it in 
person ••• to appreciate it .. II Pet. A57. 
Petr sued for invasion of privacy, contending that resp had 
appropriated his professional talents. The trial court granted resp's 
motion for summary judgment without opinion, but the state CA reversed. 
The Ohio Supreme Court . held that petr's complaint made out a 
valid claim for invasion of privacy. 
as a (!ight o! publici~" "a right 
..., 
publicity given to his performances 
The Supreme Court characterized this 
of exclusive control over the 
II The court went on to assume 
that petr's public performance did not constitute an abandonment of his 
right of publicity beyond the limits of the fair. 
The court then turned to "[t]he decisive issue in the case • 
whether the defendant TV station had a privilege to film and televise 
the plaintiff's performance, on its nightly news program II 
!/ 
An affidavit by the photographer-reporter accompanying the motion 
for summary judgment alleged that "news reporters and cameramen are 
admitted to the fair by its promoters without charge in order to permit 
news coverage and generate publicity for the fair." Pet. A54-56. 
Reviewing this Court's decisions in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, and 
~ New York Times v. Sullivan, the court concluded that 
"[j]ust as the press was held to be privileged to report 
matters which would otherwise be private, .•. [t]he 
same privilege exists in cases where appropriation of a 
right of publicity is claimed, and the privilege may 
properly be said to be lost where the actual intent of 
the publication is not to give publicity to matters of 
legitimate public concern ..•. The proper standard must 
~/ necessarily be whether the matters reported were of public 
I~D interest, and if so, the press will be liable for appropri-
~ ati o n- of a performer's right of publicity only if its actual 
n , ~~intent was not to report the performance, but, rather, to 
~ appropriate the performance for some other private use, or 
 ·"' if the actual intent was to injure the performer." 
The privilege remained intact in this case. The court thought petr's 
performance was a matter of legitimate public interest, which resp treated 
r-----------------------------------------------as such, as evidenced by its use of the film only once, and then in con-
junction with one of its nightly news broadcasts. 
Justice Celebrezze complained in dissent that the majority over-
looked Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, and that summary judg-
ment was improper because of unresolved issues of material fact, among 
them whether petr was a public figure and whether resp's broadcast of 
petr's act was prompted by commercial motives. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr amplifies the dissent, arguing that 
there are no considerations of free public debate which motivated the 
New York ~imes test. Indeed that standard is inapplicable where the 
claim is for appropriation, not defamatory falsehood. Petr argues that I 
since he is clearly not a public figure Gertz mandates far less First 
Amendment protection for resp. 
Resp maintains that both the substantive cause of action and 
the privilege in this case are solely state common-law creations, which in 
any event have an independent basis in Ohio constitutional law. Resp 
also argues that petr is a public figure and that the state supreme court's 
test is consistent with New York Times and its progency. Finally, resp 
notes that the facts of this case are unique, that performers ordinarily 
have adequate means to control media coverage and so safeguard their 
right of publicity, and that resp's use of the film was de minimis. 
4. DISCUSSION: Though the state supreme court does not 
give us the location of the "privilege" as clearly as it might, the court 
cites and discusses only First Amendment cases by this Court. The opinion 
is an attempt to accommodate the Ohio law of defamation with First 
Amendment guarantees. Since the result is predicated solely on resp's 
First Amendment defense, we have jurisdiction under §1257(3). 
On the merits, petr cannot bring his case squarely within any 
of the relevant precedents because the privacy interest he is asserting 
has not yet been addressed by this Court in the First Amendment context. 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, a "false light" privacy case, the Court 
J) \,\ 
~ held that factually erroneous statements about matters of public interest 
deserved New York Times protection, even though the plaintiffs in Hill 
were apparently private individuals. In Gertz, a defamation case, the 
New York Times standard was held too stringent a . protection for defamatory 
falsehoods about private individuals. The Court rejected the "general 
or public interest" distinction as a means for determining the con-
, stitutional protection to be given defamatory publications. This appeared 
to inter Time, Inc. v. Hill, but Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 
~ 
419 U.S. 245, 250-51, another "false light" privacy case, revivified it 
by reserving the question whether "a State may constitutionally apply a .'-____________________ '-____________ _ 
more relaxed standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of false 
statements injurious to a private individual under a false-light theory 
of invasion of privacy, or whether the constitutional standard announced 
in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false-light cases." 
While also reserving final judgment on Time, Inc. v. Hill, Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 & n.l9, indicated that different 
constitutional standards may apply depending upon whether the tort action 
is one for defamation, where New York Times defends against lawsuits by 
public officials or public figures, or invasion of privacy, where the 
inquiry is whether "the materials published, although assertedly private, 
are 'matters of public interest.' " See id. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring). 
In Cox Broadcasting, a "public disclosure" privacy case, the Court found 
it u necessary to reach 
"the broader question whether truthful publications may ever 
be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently 
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it 
another way, whether the State may ever define and protect 
an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the 
press •••. " 420 u.s. at 491. 
The applicable constitutional test case has not yet been 
formulated. New York Times is inapposite this case has nothing 
to do with defamatory falsehood, but with whether petr can forbid a 
televised publication which is only too faithful to reality. Though the 
question is quite close to that reserved in Cox Broadcasting, this is not 
\' 
a report or comment on petr's performance; it is an ~appropriation, for 
whatever purpose, of the entire act itself. Indeed Cox Broadcasting, supra 
at 489, recognizes that "right of publicity" actions may call into play 
a wholly different analysis: "we should recognize that we do not have 
at issue here an action for the invasion of privacy involving the 
appropriation of one's name or photograph • II 
Even though the state court found this to be a matter of public 
interest, it would be a mistake to treat this as a "false light" privacy 
case determined by the vitality of Time, Inc. v. Hill. By the same -
~ token, it makes little sense to make the case turn on petr's status as a 
public figure (of which there was no finding below). 
The essence of the right which petr asserts is prevention of the 
~ exploitation of someone who is presumably already in the public eye and 
whose actions are matters of public interest. Some of the key variables 
would appear to be whether petr has contracted away his right with respect 
to this performance, and whether resp's conduct constitutes an appropri-
ation harmful to petr's commercial interests. The record here is probably 
inadequate on both counts. It is also unclear to me that this case 
presents a recurring problem, or that petr has any damages. 
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TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Gene Corney 
RE: No. 76-577, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO 
The petition for cert poses the following question: "where a 
performer has a protected right of publicity--the right of exclusi~ 
control over his professional affairs--and that right is held as 
a matter of state law to have been infringed by a television 
.....--.. 
stat.-ion 1 s filming of his entire act over his specific objection, ..___... 
and the broadcasting thereof on a nightly news show, is the television 
station's tortious conduct immunized as a matter of law by the First 
Amendment .... " 
JURISDICTION: Respondent suggests that this Court does not 
have jurisdiction over the case in that there is an adequate and 
independent state ground. The thrust of this point is that the 
Ohio Supreme Court based its decision on a state law privilege, 
and that a state is of course free to give the press more protection 
than that required by the First Amendment. Thus, even if the First 
Amendment does not require the result below, the state law privilege 
does so require. 
Given the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court, this contention 
't 
would ordinarily be easily resolved just b~ looking at it. But the 
complication is, of course, the fact that only the syllabus necessarily 
carries the approval of the Ohio Supreme Court. And respondent 
presses strongly the point that the syllabus does not mention 
the first amendment. 
I think it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction. To ~ 
b egin with, this case seems to be on all fours with Perkins v. 
Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, cited by respondent in its brief. 
In that case, a foreign corporation temporarily carried on a continuous 
~ 
but limited part of its general business in Ohio. W~ile enaged in 
doing such business in Ohio, its president was served with a summons 
in an action in personam against the corporation filed in an Ohio 
state court by a nonresident of Ohio. The cause of action did not 
arise in Ohio and did not relate to the corporation's activities 
in that state. The trial court sustained a motion to quash the 
service of summons. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Its syllabus 
makes no mention of the Fourteenth Amendment. It simply states 
that the doing of business by this foreign corporation would not 
make the corporation subject to service of process. This Court 
expressly recognized that "[i]fthe [syllabus] stood alone, it might 
mean that the decision rested solely upon the law of Ohio." Indeed, 
I would note that there is nothing to prevent Ohio from establishing 
procedural protections as to service of process above and beyond those 
mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment. But this Court stated that the 
syllabus had to be read "in the light of the facts and issues of the 
case," and found that the opinions in the case expressed the view 
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited Ohio from asserting jurisdiction 
over the respondent corporation. This Court then concluded that "for 
... · 
1'~ 
us to allow the judgment to stand as it is would risk an affirmance 
of a decision which might have been decided differently if the Court 
below had felt free, under our decisions, to do so." The Court 
proceeded in that case to determine that the Fourteenth Amendment 
would not prohibit Ohio from asserting jurisdiction over the 
foreign corporation. 
This case seems to me to be in an identical posture, and 
in light of Perkins I see no ba.r -tD reaching 
the merits. 
THE MERITS: This is an interesting and important case, but 
also one that is quite difficult. Indeed, I find it hard to get 
a fairly good grasp on the precise questions at issue. In any event, 
I am quite surprised to find the Court in the posture of deciding 
what could be a very important First Amendment case without the aid 
of interested amici such as broadcasters and newspapers. For some 
reason, the news media apparently does not realize that this case 
has the potential of being a major First Amendment decision. 
Before discussing the legal issues, I want to make one comment 
about the nature of the state ~created right that is at issue here. 
There has been some discussion in this case as to whether we are 
dealing with a "right of privacy" or a "right of publicity." In 
my view they are in most contexts ~uch as thi~ two sides of the same 
coin. To use Justice Whiteis language in Cox Broadcasting, what -
we are really confronted with is a state defined and protected 
"area of privacy free from unwanted publicity." I emphasize the word 
"unwanted." Some people consider a part of their lives "private" 
and seek to avoid publicity as to that part of their lives because 
a preference for privacy. In that context, it seems appropriate 
to talk about a right to privacy. 
There are other situations in which an individual plans to 
make a part of his life "open" to the public, but, perhaps for 
reasons of commercial profit, the individual wants to control access 
to what he intends to expose. In that context, it seems appropriate 
to talk of a "right of publicity." In both cases the individual 
seeks to limit exposure of his actions to the public. The extent 
and nature of the exclusion differs in the two contexts, but it 
nonethless is essentially a right to exclude publication of a part 
of one's life. 
Where does the First Amendment fit into this scheme of 
individual interests in limiting publication about one's life? 
To begin with, it is worth emphasizing that the First Amendment does 
not require that States recognize and protect areas of privacy 
free from unwanted publicity. Putting to one side other possible 
....._ ~..........,.... I 
federal constitutional constraints such as substantive due process, 
l 
the First Amendment leaves the States free to decide whether to 
define and create an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity. 
On the other hand, once CL State does decide to create 
such an area, the First Amendment must be considered in 
dete~ng whether there are federal constitutional limits on the 
scope of the area of privacy created and enforced by the State. 
In the instant case, it is clear from paragraph 2 of the syllabus 
I that the Ohio Suprme Court has recognized in the performer a "right to the publicity value of his performance." The question 
for us is whether, and to what extent, the First Amendment requires 
a privilege for legitimate news use of aspects of the performance. 
~ 
None of our prior cases ~ directly applicable in resolving 
that question. I have reread the cases from New York Times v. 
Sullivan through last Term's decision in Firestone, and I find them 
We are dealing in this case with an entirely 4 ~ generally inagplicable. 
I~ ------~-----~~ v 
• ~curate and comprehensile report of an o~viously newsworthy event. 
........ :we 
We are not confronted with questions of defamation, false light 
privacy, public figure doctrine, or the scope of matters of public 
interest. Moreover, we are not confronted here with appropriation 
..... 
~ for the purpose of commercial advertising or the use of aspects of 
the performance to promote the sale of goods. For reasons that will 
appear shortly, I think the most relevant precedent is Cox 
This Court specifically noted in Cox Broadcasting that it was 
not addressing the question whether truthful publications may ever 
be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it another way, whether 
the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from 
unwanted publicity in the press. 420 U.S. at 491. In this case 
we must address that question at least in part. The reason I say 
"in part" is quite important--we have before us a narrow state-
cre.ated area of privacy. First of all, the State has not protected 
this area of privacy--the performance--from all truthful publication. 
I 
The press is Still free to write about, describe, and criticize 
Zacchini's performance. Zacchini argues that the First Amendment 
does not require that the State extend to news broadcaseters the 
privilege of filming his entire performance and showing it on the 
nightly news. He apparently would not be concerned if they 
aired a still photograph of his coming out of the cannon or his 
landing on the net. The second narrow aspect to this case is that 
the area which the State has defined to be private is limited to 
:# 
performers. We ar~alking in this case, according to syllabus 
#2, about the right to the publicity value of a performance. 
We are not confronted here with broader questions of the right 
to film public figures performing private though newsworthy activities. 
For example, we are not dealing here with whether the press could 
tomorrow film the Secretary of State taking a stroll alongside the 
B&O Canal while thinking about the problems of the nation. 
I stress these points because I think they have relevance to 
the First Amendment balance. On the one side, the fact that this 
mse involves a limitation on the nature and extent of media coverage 
rather than a complete ban on discussion is something to be considered. 
Of course, one might argue that this cuts the other way if there is 
any meaning to the argument that a picture is worth a thousand 
words. On the other side of the balance there is, when one considers 
only "performances", a legitimate state interest that may not be . 
' present ~n other contexts. 
the interest which underlies 
The state interest is analagous to 
our federal copyright and patent 
give to the performer the right to decide whether and how much 
publicity he needs by giving him the right to control publicity. 
Although these are relevant considerations, the tough question is 
one of result. 
Determining the final result in this case is complicated 
somewhat by the factual situation, so I will start down the road 
with a few hypotheticals. 
Suppose a performer gets copyright protection on a 
play, rents a small theater, and performs the play. He allows 
admission only for a fee, he bars the use of tape recorders 
and note pads and pencils, and allows pursuant to contract one 
T.V. network to film the performance for the purpose of live T.V. 
transmission to local stations. So far there are no real 
F~ Amendment problems. The First Amendment does not require 
that the press be admitted free of charge. It does not require 
that the press be entitled to bring in tape recorders or even 
note pads. It does not require that the performer contract with 
a T.V. network for live transmission; and if he does so, it does 
not require that he provide the same opportunity to all networks. 
7 
The press can report the play. They can describe it. They 
can criticize it. They cannot reproduce it word for word since it 
is a copyrighted production. But there is in copyright the 
doctrine of fair use, which allows a relative short or small portion 
of a copyrighted work to be used without authorization from the 
copyright owner if the user has a valid reason to do so and 
the use does not adversely affect the owner's interests. 
[A common example of fair use is a quotation in a book review.] 
The roots of the fair use doctrine in the copyright area are 
obscure, but they have not--to my knowledge--been developed under 
the First Amendment and its interrelationship with the copyrights 
clause. 
Now suppose the performance is something that cannot be \ 
JtJ _... 
copyrighted, It could be a pro6fessional fight or a human 
........ ~ 
cannonball. Again the performer can exclude all those except 
those willing to pay admission, and he can sell live TV rights. 
Suppose he decides not to have his performance, or a tape thereof, 
aired on any T.V. show. Nonethless a TV station, aware of his 
prohibition on videotaping, sneaks in and tapes the performance. 
,.4.. 
It then airia small portion of the performance on the evening news 
as part of the entertainment news of the day. Can the State 
use its power to enforce a tort judgment against the TV station 
o~ehalf of the producer, or does that infringe the First Amendment? 
There are three possible answers. First, it does infringe the -First Amendment. The press should be free to attempt to get 
access for the purpose of taping things like this, and they should 
~I It .is important to stress cannot be copyrighted. For 
if the performance can be copyrighted and has not been copyrighted, 
there is a preemption issue--at ~ least a potential issue--if the State 
,-.. 
th1rough its tort law gives a "property right" to something that 
could have been but was not copyrighted. 
not be subject to civil liability for the act of publication. This 
performance is in the public domain, just as the records in Cox 
Broadcasting were public records. Once a performer decides to 
place his performance in the public domain, the press can film it 
and display it without being subected to civil liability by the 
State. Moreover, since the State cannot establish civil liability 
for the act of publicity, it cannot establish an independent liability 
for the act of having violated the producer's restrictions on filming. 
[There might be exceptions to this position, not relevant here, 
where the act of filming or taking pictures with flash bulbs actually 
intereferes with the performance.] 
2 . The second approach is to conclude that it is not inconsistent 
with the First Amendment for the State to establish civil liability 
in this context. This position would emphasize that we left open 
in Cox the extent to which a state could define and protect an area 
of privacy free from unwanted truthful publicity. This case does 
not require us to resolve that broad question. All we need say 
is that with respect to performances, the State interest in protecting 
-------------------------------~ private citizens and their valuable publi~y rights in entertainment 
~ ------------ ~-------------------------justifies this particular restriction on the media. 
~ . Finally, the third approach would be to take a case by case 
balancing approach, using the factors that have been developed in 
~ '-
the application of the fair use doctrine in copyright law. These 
c ..... """* ---
factors include: (l)):he extent to whichthe use is in competition 
with the copyright owner and affects his market; (2) The size and 
relative importance of the part used; (3) the nature of the 
performance; and (4) The user's reasons for appropriating the work 
and for not seeking permission. 
/0 
My present incliniation is to go with the second alternative. 
As you have noted in a different context--Gertz--there is not much 
to be said in favor of the case-by-case approach. And as between 
..-.....,____._ --- - --- -
the first and second alternatives, in this limited area the 
state interest which is analagous to the interest that underlises 
our copyright laws seems to me sufficient to justify this infringement 
of First Amendment freedoms. 
Application of that approach to this case is complicated. 
First, if we are willing to allow the State to give Zacchini a 
property right the publicity value of his performance 
that is not subject to a news privilege as to videotaped reproductions, 
we have to determine whether he retained that right or passsed it 
'---
m to the producers who ran the county fair. This is an important 
inquiry, since it appears that the producers gave news people free 
mmission to the fair, while Zacchini told the film crew not to film 
his act. In circumsatnces such as this, we don't want the press 
to have to guess as to who really holds the property right and what 
the owner of the right wants to do with it. Here however the press 
could have checked on this during the intervening day between the 
first attempt to film and the actual filming. Moreover, to 
fuis point everyone seems to have assumed that Zacchini had the 
property right. Subject to further rethinking, 
it might be best to just treat the case as one in which Zacchini 
hid the right. 
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No. 76-577 -:- Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co. 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner, Hugo Zacchini, . is an entertainer. He · 
per~orms . a "human cannonball" act in which he is shot from 
a cannon into a net some 200 feet away. Each performance 
occupies some 15 seconds. In August and September,. 1972, 
petitioner was engaged to perform his act on a regular basis 
at the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. lie p.erformed in a 
fenced area, surrounded by grandstands, at the fair grounds. 
Members of the public attending the fair were not charged a 
separate admission fee to observe his act. 
On August 30, a free lance reporter for Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Company, the operator of a television broadcasting 
station and respondept in this case, attended the fair. He 
carried a small movie . camera. Petitioner noticed the reporter 
and asked him not ·to film the performance. The reporter did not 
do so · on th~t day; but on the instructions of the producer of 
respondent's daily newscast, he returned the following day and 
'*· : 
.. , .. 
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vi,deotaped .the entire act. This film clip, approximately 15 
seconds in .length, was shown ori the 11:00 o'clock news program 
. 1/ . 
that: night, ·together with favorable comrtlentary. 
Petit.ioner them brought this. action for damages, alleging 
that he is "engaged in the entertainment business," that the act 
he performs is one "invented by his · father and . • • performed 
only by his family for the last. SO years," that respondent · "showed 
·and .corrimercialized the film of his . act without · his consent," and 
that such conduct was an "unlawful appropriation of. ·plaintiff's 
professionai property." Ap.p. 4-5. Respondent answered and moved 
. . 
for .surnmary judgment, which was summarily· granted by the trial 
court. 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. The majo-rity held 
that petitioner's complaint stated a cause ·of action for conversion 
and for fnfringement of a common law copyright, and one judge con-
. curred in the judgment on the ground that the c'omplaint stated a 
cause of action for appropriation of .petitioner's "right o:f 
publicity" in the film of his act. All three judges agreed that 
the First Amendment did not privilege the press to show the entire 
p.erforrn:ance ·on a news program without compensating petitioner for 
any financial injury he could prove at trial • 
. Like the concurring judge in ttle Court of Appeals, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio rested petitioner's cause of action under 
state law on his •iright to the publicity value of his performance." 
47 Ohio St. 2d 224, _ N.E. 2d _ (1976)• The opinion Syllabus~ 
Zacchini - 3 -
to which we are to look for the rule ·of law used to decide . the 
2/ 
case, declared first that one may not use for his own benefit 
the name or .likeness of another, whether or ~bt the use or bene-
fit is a cornrnerc~al one, and ·second that respondent would be liable 
for the appropriation, over petitioner's objection and without 
license or privilege, of petitioner's right to the publicity value 
of his performance~ Ibid. The court nevertheless gave judgment 
fo~ ~espondent b~cause, in the words of the Syllabqs: 
·~ TV station has a privilege to report 
in its news ca sts matters of legitimate 
public ~nterest which would otherwise be 
protected by an individual's right of 
publicity, unless the actual int~nt of 
the TV station· was to appropriate the 
benefit of the publicity for some non-
privileged private use, or unless the -
actual intent was to injure the individual." 
Ibid. 
We granted certiorari, __ U.S._ (1977), to consider 
an issue unresolved by this Court: whether the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments immunized respondent .from damages for its . 
alleged infringement of petitioner's state law ''right of publicity." 
Petition for Cert{orari 2. Insofar as the Ohio Supreme Court held 
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution required judgment for respondent, we reverse the 
judgment of that court. 
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II 
If · the judgment below rested on an independent and 
adequate · state ground, the writ of cert:i,..orari should be 
dismissed as improvidently granted, Wilson v. Lowes, 355 U.S. 
597 (1958), . for "our only power over state judgments is to 
correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal 
laws . . And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to re-
vise opinions. We are not permitted · to render an advisory 
opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state 
court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review 
could amount to . nothing more than an advisory opinion." Herb v. 
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-126 (1945). We ' are confident, how-
ever, that the judgment below did not rest on an adequate and 
independent · state ground and that we have jurisdiction to decide 
the federal issue presentedin this case. 
There is no doubt that petitioner's complaint was grounded 
in stat~ law and that the right of publicity whi6h petitioner was 
held to possess was a right under Ohio law . . It is also clear 
that respondent's claim of constitutional privilege was sustained. 
The source of this privilege was not identified in the Syllabus. 
It . is clear enough from the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court, 
· which we are permitted to consult ·for understanding qf the Syllabus, · 
. 3/ . 
Perkins v. Ben~uet Mining Co .. ·, 342 U.S. 437, 442-443 (1952),-
that in ·adjudicating the crucial question of whether respondent had 
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a privilege to film and televise respondent's performance, the 
court. turne.d immediately to Time, Inc. v. HiLL, 385 U.S. 374 
· (196 7) . It cons tru•ed the principle of that case, along with 
that of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 354 (1964), to be 
that "the press has a pr.ivilege to report matters of legitimate 
public intere~t even though such reports might iritrude on matters 
otherwise pr·i vate," and concluded, therefore, that the press is 
also . "privileged when an individual seeks to publicly exploit his 
talents while keeping the benefits private." 47 Ohio St. 2d, at 
234, _ N.E~ 2d, at _. The privilege thus exists in cases 
"where the appropriation of the right of publicity is claimed." 
. . 
The court's opinion also referred to Draft 21 of the relevant 
portion of Restatement of Torts Second, which was understood to 
· make room for reasonable press appropriations by limiting the 
reach of the right of privacy rather than by .creating a privileged 
invasion. The opinion said, however, that "the gravamen of the 
issue in this case is not whether the degree of ·intrusion is 
. . 
reasonable but whether First ·Amendment principles require that the 
right of privacy give~· way to the public right to be informed of 
matters ·of public interest and concern. The concept of privilege 
seems the more useful and appropriate one." Id., at 234 n. 5, 
N.E. 2d, at ___ · . (Emphasis added.) 
The controlling consideration was thus one of privilege 
rather than of the substantive reach of the right of publicity • . 
In deciding the question, had the Ohio court rested on both state 
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and federal grounds, either of which would .have been dispositive, 
we wo.uld have ·no juris dicti.on. Fox Films v. Mueller, 296 
. U.S. ·207 (1935); Enterprise Irrigation District v. · Farmers Mutual 
.Canal Company, 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917) • . · But the opinion, like 
the Syllabus, did not mention the Ohio constitution, citing 
instead this .Court's First Amendment cases as controlli~3. lt 
appea~s to us that decision rested solely on federal grounds. 
That the Ohio · court might have, but did not, invoke· state law does 
not foreclose jurisdiction here. - Steel v. l.&N R. Co., 323 U.S. 
192, 197 n. 1 (1944); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 
95, 98 (1938). 
If the judgment in favor of respondent must - nev~rtheless 
be understood as ultimately res.ting on Ohio law, it appears that 
at the very least the Ohio court felt compelled by what it understood 
to be federa;l constitutional considerations to construe and apply 
its own law in the manner it did. In this event, we have jurisdic-
tion and should. decide the federal issue; for if the state court 
erred in its understanding of our· cases and of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, we should so declare, leaving the state 
court free to decide the privilege issue solely as a matter of Ohio 
law. Perkins v. Benquet Mining Co., supra. "If the Supreme Court 
[of Ohio] held as it did because it felt under compulsion of 
federal law as enunciated by this Court so to hold, it should be 
relieved of -that compulsion. It should be freed to decide these 
suits according to .its own local law." Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 
u . s ~ 1 ' 5 ( 19 50 ) . .,. . 
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III 
The .Ohio Supreme Court held that respondent is 
constitutionally privileged to include in . its newscasts matters 
of public interest that would otherwise be protected by the 
ri"ght of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate 
for some nonprivileged purpose. If under this standard re~pon-
·dent had merely reported that petitioner was performing at the 
fair ·and described or commented on his act, with or without showing 
his picture on television, we would have a very different case. 
But petitioner is not contending that his appearance at the fair 
and his performance could· not be reported by the press as news- · 
worthy items. His complaint is that respondent filmed his ~ntire 
act and displayed that film on television "fo"r the public to see 
~ . 
and enjoy. This, he claimed, _was an appropriation of his pro-
fessional property. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed that petitioner 
had "a right of publicity" that gave. him "personal .cont1:ol over 
the commercial display and exploitation of his personality and . the 
. 4/ . 
exercise qf his talents." -- This right of "exclusive control 
over the publicity given to his performance" was said to be such 
.· a "valuable part of the . benefit which may be attained by his 
talents and effo1:ts" that it was entitled to legal protection. It 
was also observed, or at least expressly assumed, that petitioner 
had not abandoned his rights by performing under the circumstances 
present at the Geauga County Fair Grounds. 
. .. 
Zacchini - 8 -
The Ohio Supreme Court nevertheless held that the 
challenged invasion was privileged, saying that the pr~ss "must 
' be accorded broad · latitude in its choice of how much it presents 
of each story or incident, -and of the emphasis to b~ given to 
such presentation. No fixed standard which would bar the press 
. . 
from reporting or depicting either an entire occurrence or an 
entire discrete part of a public er formance can be formula ted 
..-- -
which would not unduly restrict the 'breathing room' in reporting --------which freedom of the press requires." 47 Ohio St., at 235, . --
N .E. 2d, at _· _. _ . . Under this view, respondent was thus consti-
5/ 
tutio~ally free to film and display petitioner's entire act. -
The Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, supra, but that case does not mandate a media privilege to 
televise a performer's entire act without his consent. Involved 
in ~' .!l!.£· v. Hill was a claim under the New York "Right of 
Privacy" statute that Life Magazine, in the co\;l.rse of reviewing a 
newplay, had connected the play witha long~past incident involving 
petitioner and his family and had ·falsely described their exper-
ience and conduct at that time. · The complaint sought damages for 
humiliation and suffering flowing from these nondefamatory false-
hoods that allegedly invaded Hill's privacy. The Court held, 
however, that the opening of a new play linked to an actual incident 
was a matter of public interest and that Hill could not recover 
without $hewing that the Life report was knowingly false or was 
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· published with reckless disregard for the truth-- the sa~e 
rigorcn~s standard th.at had been applied in New York Times v. 
Sullivan, supra. 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, which was hotly contested and decided 
by a divided Cburt, involved an entirely di...fferent tort than the 
"right of publicity" recognized by . the Ohio Supreme Court. As 
the opinion reveals in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court was steeped 
in the liter.ature of privacy law and was aware of the developing 
distinctions and nuances in this branch of the .law. The Court, 
for example) cited Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (3d Ed. 
1964), and the same author's well-known arti<_:!le, Privacy, 48 Cal. 
L. Rev. 383 (1960), both of which divided privacy into four dis-
l/ 
tinct branches. The Court was aware that it was adjudicating 
a "faise light" privacy case involving a matte~ of public interest, 
not a case involving "intrusion·," _385 U.S., at 384-385 n. 9, "ap-
propr.iation" of a name ·ox: likeness for the purposes of trade, id., 
at 381, or "private details" about a non-news:wo.rthy person or event, 
id., ·at 383 n. 7. It is also abundantly clear that Time, Inc. v. 
Hill did not involve a performer, a person with a name having 
commercial value, or any claim to a "right of . publicity." This · 
discrete kind of "appropriation" case was plainly identified in the . . . 8/ 
literature cited by the Court - and had been adjudicated in the 
9/ 
reported cases. -
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The differences between these two .torts are important. 
Fit:st, the State's l.nterests in providing a cause of action in 
each instance are different. "The interest protected" in per-
mittin.g recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light "is 
· ~
clearly that of reputat.ion, with the same overtones of mental 
distress as in defamation." P.rosser, supra, 48 Cal. L. Rev., at 
400. By contrast, the State's in·terest in permitting . a "right of 
publicity" is in protecting the proprietary interest of the in-
--- . --- 10/ 
dividual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment. --------As. we later note, the State's interest is closely analogous to the 
goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the . right of the 
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and ..having_little 
t:o do with .protecting feelings or reputation. Second, the two 
torts differ in the degree to which they intrude on dissemination 
of information to the p~blic. In "false light" cases the only 
to protect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize 
publication of the damaging matter, while in "right of publicity" 
cases the only question is who gets to do the publishing. An 
entertainer such as ~etitioner usually has no objection to the 
widespread publication of his act as long as he gets · the commercial 
benefit of such publication. Indeed, in the present case peti-
tioner did not seek to enjoin the broadcast· of his act; he simply 
sought compensation for the broadcast in the form of damages. 
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Nor does it appear that our later cases, such as 
Rosenbtoom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); and Time, Inc .. v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448 (1_976) , require or furnish substant"ial support for 
the ·Ohio court's privilege ruling.. These cases, like New York 
Times, emphasize the protection extended to the press by the 
First Amendment in defamation cases, particularly when suit is 
brought by a public official or a public figure . . None of them 
involve an alleged appropriation by the press of a right of 
publicity existing under state law. 
Moreover, Time, Inc. v. Hill, New York Times, Metromedia, 
Gertz, and Firestone all involved the reporting of events; in 
none of them was there an attempt to broadcast or publish an -- - . 
E ire act) for which the performer _Qr_9 inarily · gets paid. It is 
evident, and there is no claim here to the contrary, that peti-
tioner's -state-law right of publicity would not serve to prevent 
resp;ndent from reporting ~worthy factJ about petitioner's 
11/  -------~ 
act. - Whereve.r the line in particular situations is to be 
d,rawn betweenmedia reports that are protected and those that are 
not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire 
act without his consent. The Constitution no more prevents a -State from r .equiring respondent to compensate petitioner for 
broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege 
respondent to film and broadcast a co·pyrighted dramatic work 
without liability to the copyright owner, 17 U.S.C., 
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cf. Kalem· Co. v. Harper Bros. ; 222 U.S. 55 (1911) ; Manners v .• 
Moresco, 252 U.S. 317 (1920), or to film and broadcast a prize 
fight, Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp.~ 229 F.2d 
481 (CA 3 1956), or a baseball game, Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. 
KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938), where the 
promoters or the participants had other plans for publicizing the 
event~ There are ample reasons for reaching this conclusion. 
cast of a film of etitioner's entire act poses -
a substantial threat to the economic value of the ac~ As the 
Ohio court recognized, this act is the product of _petitioner's own 
talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort and ex- · 
pense. Much of . its economic value lies in the "right of exclusive 
control over the publicity given to his performance"; if the 
public can see the act for . free on television they will be less 
12/ 
willing to pay to see it at the fair. - The effect of a public 
broadcast of the performance is similar to preventing petitioner 
from charging an admission fee. · "The rationale for [protecting 
~~ he right of publicit~]is the straightforward one of preventing 
unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is 
- --
\ C1 served by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the 
~cf""· plaintiff that would have market value and f~r which he would 
normally pay." Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and . 
Brand~is Wrong?, 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 331 (1966). 
Moreover, the broadcast etitioner's entire performance, unlike __ _.._ 
the unauthorized USe Of another IS name. for the purpOSeS Of trade 
Zacthini - 13 -
or the irtcidental use of .. · a name or picture by the press, oes 
to the h_gsitt of p..etitioner 's ability to . ea~n a living as a_n 
. ' -
entertainer. . Thus in this case, Ohio has recognized what may be 
the strongest case for a "right of publicity" -- involving riot 
the appropriation of an entertainer's reputation to enhance the 
attractiveness of acommercial product, but the appropriation of 
the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation 
in the first place. 
Of course, Ohio's decision to protect petitioner's right 
of publicity here rests on more than a des·ire to compensate the 
performer for the . time .and effort invested in his act; the pro-
tection provides an economic incentive for him to make the 
investment requir~d to produce a performance of interest to the 
public. This same consideration underlies ~he . patent and copyright 
laws long enforced by this Cou.rt. As the Co1,1rt stated in Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 u.s. 201~ 219 (1964), 
"The economic ·philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant . 
patents and copyrights · is the conviction 
that encouragement of individual effort 
by personal gain is the best way to ad-
vance public welfare through the talents 
of authors and inventors in 'Science and 
useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted 
to such creative activities deserve re-
wards commensurate with the services 
rendered." 
These laws perhaps .regard the "reward to the owner a secondary 
· consideration," United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 
158 (194.8), but they were "intended definitely to grant valuable, 
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enforceable rights" in order to afford greater encouragement 
to the production of works of benetit to the .public. Washingtonian 
Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 .u.s. 30, 36 (1939). The Constitu-
tion does not prevent Ohio from making a similar choice here in 
deciding to protect . the entertainer's incentive in order to 
enc6urage the production of this type of work for public benefit. 
Cf.' Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Kewanee Oil Co. 
13/ 
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 476 (1974). 
There is no doubt that ·entertainment, as well as news, 
enjoys First Amendment protection. It is also .true that entertain-
ment itself· can be important .news. Time, Inc. y. Hill, supra. But 
it is important to note · that neither the public rior respondent will 
be deprived of the benefit of petitioner's performance as ·long as 
his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized. 
Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; 
he simply wants to be paid for it. Nor do we think that a state-law 
damages remedy against respondent would represent a species of 
li~bility without fault contrary to the letter or spirit of Gertz, 
Respondent knew exactly that petitioner objected to tele-
his act, but nevertheless displayed the entire film. 
. 14/ ~ 
We conclude, as have others,- that although the State of 
Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the 
circumstances of this case, the. First and Fourteenth Amendments do 
· not require it to do so. 
Reversed. 
Zacchini footnotes 
1_/ The script of the commentary accompanying the film 
clip read as follows: 
"This • ·now is the story of a true specta-
tor .sport . the sport of human cannonballing . • 
in fact, the great Zacchini is . about the only human 
·Cannonball around, these days ... just happens that, 
where he is, is the Great Geauga County Fair, in 
Burton . and believe me, although it'$ not a long 
act, it's a thriller •.. and you really ·need to see 
'it ·in person . . . to appreciate 
· in original.) · App. 12. 
• .II 
~t .. . . . {Emphasis 
!:_/ Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 93 n. 2 (1964); Perkins 
v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, . 441-443 (1952); Minne-
sota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 554 (1940). See 
Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17 (1967); The Williamson 
Heater Co. v. Radich, 128 Ohio St. 124 (1934); Thackery v. 
Helfrich, 123 Ohio St. 334, 336 (1931); State v. Hauser, 101 
Ohio St. 404, 408 (1920); 14 Ohio Jur. 2d I 247. 
}/ !n Perkins the issue was whether the Ohio courts 
could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion. The Syllabus of the Ohio Supreme Court declared that 
it did not have personal jurisdiction, but it gave no indi-
cation of whether the Ohio court's decision rested on state 
grounds or on the Fourteenth Amendment. The only opinion 
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filed with the Syllabus reasoned, however, that the Due 
Process Clause of .the Fourteenth Amendment p.rohibited the 
Ohio courts from exercising personal jurisdiction in that 
case. While recognizing the existence of the Ohio Syllabus 
. rule, _this Court felt obliged in these circumstances to reach 
the merits of the constitutional issue, holding that the Due 
Process Clause did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction. 
"[F]or us to allow the judgment to stand as it is would risk 
an affirmance of a decision which might have been decided 
differently if the court below had felt free, under our 
decisions, to do so." 342 U.S., at 443. 
4/ The court relied on Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 
133 N.E. 2d 340 (1956), the Syllabus of which held: 
"An actionable invasion of the right of 
privacy is the unwarranted appropriation or exploi-
tation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's 
private affairs with which the public has no legiti-
mate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's 
private activities in such a manner as to outrage 
or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to 
a person or ordinary sensibilities." · 
The court also indicated that the applicable principles of 
Ohio law were those set out in Restatement of Torts Second, 
Tentative Draft . No. 13, 1967, . § 252c, and the comments 
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thereto, portions of which ·were .stated in the footnotes of 
the opinion. Also, referring to the right as the "right of 
' publicity," the court quoted approvingly from Haelan Labora-
tories, Inc . . v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., · 202 F. 2d 866, 868 
(C .A. 2 (1952). 
2/ The court's expfication was as follows: 
"The proper standard must necessarily be whether 
the matters reported were of public interest, and ..... ~ 
if so, the press will be liable for appropriation 
of a performer's right of publicity only if its 
actual intent was not to report the performance, 
but, rather, to appropriate the performance for 
some other private use, or if the actual intent 
was to injure the performer. It might also be the 
case that the press would be liable if it reck-
lessly disregarded contract rights existing between 
the plaintiff and a third person to present the 
p: rformance to the public, but that question is 
not presented here." 47 Ohio St., at 235, _._ N.E.2d, 
at . 
6/ Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law pro-
vides an action for injunction and damages for invasion of 
the "right .of privacy" granted by§ 50': 
"A person, firm or corporation that uses 
for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of 
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trade, the name, portrait or picture of any 
living person without having first obtained 
the written consent of such person, or if a 
minor of hi$ or her parent or guardian, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor." 
·ll "The law of privacy · comprises f<:>ur distinct kinds 
of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, --which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise 
have almost nothing in common except that each represents an 
interference with the right of the plaintiff." Prosser, 
Priv~cy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). Thus, according to 
Prosser, some courts had recognized a cause of action for 
"intrusion" upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude; 
public disclosure of "private facts" about the plaintiff's 
personal life; publicity that places the plaintiff in a 
"false light" in the public eye; and "appropriation" of the 
plaintiff's name or likeness for commercial purposes. One 
may be liable for "appropriation" if he "pirate[s] the 
plaintiff's identity for some advantage of his own." 48 Cal. 
L. Rev., at 403. 
§_/ See, for example, Prosser, Torts, 3rd Ed. 842 
(1964); Blaustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity; 
An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 962, 986-991 
(1964); Kalven,. Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis 
Wrong?, 3.1 Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 331 (1966). 
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21 E.~., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting 
Corp., 229 F. 2d 481 (C.A. 3 1956); Sharkey v. National 
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 93 F~ Supp. 986 (S.D. N.Y. 1950); 
Pittsburgh Athl~tic Co. v. KQV Broa<icasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 
490 (1938); Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Trans-
radio Press Service, Inc.', 165 Misc. 71, 30 N.Y.S. 159 
(1937); Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.t.Q. 314 (Pa. 
Ct. C.P. 1957); ~yers v. U. S. Camera Publishing Corp., 167 
. N.Y.S. 2d 771, City Ct. of City of N.Y. (1957). The cases 
prior to 1961 are helpfully reviewed in Gordon, Right of 
Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 
N.W.U.L. Rev. 553 (1960). 
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., supra, 
involved a challenge to television exhibition of a film made 
of a prize fight that had occurred some time ago. Judge 
Biggs, writing for the Court of Appeals, said at 229 F. 2d 
486, 490: 
"There are, speaking very generally, two 
polar types of cases. One arises when some 
accidental occurrence rends the veil of obscur-
ity surrounding an average person and makes him, 
arguable, newsworthy. The other type involves 
the appropriation of the performance or produc-
tion of a professional performer or entrepreneur. 
Between the two extremes are many gradations, 
.: 
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most involving strictly commercial exploitation 
of some aspect of an individual's personality, 
such as his name or picture. 
"The fact is that, if a performer performs for 
hire, a curtailment, without consideration, of 
his right to control his performance is a wrong 
to him. Such a wrong vitally affects his liveli-
hood, precisely as a , trade libel, for example, 
affects the earnings of a corporation. If the 
artistry of the performance he used as a cri-
terion, _every judge perforce must turn himself 
into a literary, theatrical or sports critic." 
· 10/ The Ohio Supreme Court expressed the view "that 
plaintiff's claim is one for invasion of the right of privacy 
by appropriation, and should be considered as such." 47 Ohio 
St., at 226, ___ N.E. 2d, at ___ . It should be noted, however, 
that the case before us is more limited than the broad 
category of lawsuits that may arise under the heading of 
"appropriation." Petitioner does not merely assert that 
some g.eneral use, such as advertising, was made of his name 
or likeness; he relies on the much narrower claim that 
respondent televised an entire act that he ordinarily gets 
~
paid to perform. 
.; 
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· li/ Prosser, Torts, 4th Ed. (1971), 806-807, general-
izes on the cases~ 
"The New York courts were faced very early with the 
obvious fact that newspapers and magazines, to say 
noshing of radio, television and motion pictures, . 
are by no means philanthropic institutions, but are 
operated for profit. As against the contention that 
every.thing published by these agencies must neces~ . 
sarily be 'for purposes of trade,' they were ~ompelled 
to hold that there must be some closer and more direct 
connection, beyond the mere fact that the newspaper 
itself is sold; and that the presence of advertising 
matter in adjacent columns, or even the duplication 
of a news item for the purpose of advertising the 
publication itself, does not make any difference. 
Any other conclusion would in all probability have 
been an unconstitutional interference with the 
freedom of the press. Atcordingly, it has been held 
that the mere incidental mention of the plaintiff's . 
name in a book or a motion picture is not an invasion 
of his privacy; nor is the publication of a photo-
graph or a newsreel in which he incidentally appears." 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
Compare American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, 
Tentative Draft No. 22, § 652c, Comment D~ 
' . 
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12/ It is possible, of course, that respondent's news 
broadcast increased the value of petitioner's pe.rformance by 
stimulating . the public's interest in seeing the act live. In 
. . 
these circumstances, petitioner would not be able to prove 
damages and thus would not recover. But petitioner has alleged 
that the broadcast injured him to the extent of $25,000, 
App. 5, and we think the State should be allowed to compensate 
this injury if proven. 
13/ Goldstein involved a California statute outlawing 
"record piracy"--the unauthorized duplication of recordings 
of performances by major musical artists. Petitioners there 
launched a multifaceted constitutional attack on the statute, 
but they did not argue that the statute violated the First 
Amendment. In rejecting this broad-based constitutional 
attack, this Court concluded: 
"The California statutory. scheme evidences a legis-
lative policy to prohibit 'tape piracy'' and "record 
piracy': , conduct that may adversely affect the con-
tinued production of new recordings, a large indus-
try in California. Accordingly, the State has, by 
statute, given to recordings the attributes of 
property~ No restra int has been placed on the use 
of an idea o~ concept; rather, petitioners and other 
individuals in precisely the same manner and with 
Zacchini footnotes -9-
the same persohnel as appeared on th~ original 
recording. 
•. 
"Until and .. unless Congress takes further action 
with respect to recordings . . . , the California 
statute may be enforced against acts of piracy 
such as those which occurred in the present case." 
412 U.S., at 571. (Emphasis added.) 
We note that federal district courts have rejected First 
Amendment challenges to the federal copyright law . on the 
ground that "no restraint has been placed on the use of an 
idea or concep·t." United' States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 
1265, 1267 (S.D. Okla. 1974). See also Walt Disney Produc-
tions v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 115 (N.D. Cal. 
1972) (citing Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment 
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 17 U.S.L.A.L. Rev. 1180 
(1970), arguing that. copyright law does not abridge the First 
Amendment because it does not restrain the communication of 
ideas or concepts); Robert Stigwood GrouB Ltd v. O'Reilly, 
346 F. Supp. 376 . (D. Conn. 1972) (also relying on Ninnner). 
Of course this case does not make a claim that respondents 
would be prevented by petitioner's "right of publicity" from 
staging or filming its own "human cannonball" act. 
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In Kewanee this Court upheld the constitutionality of 
Ohio's trade .secret law, although again no First Amendment 
claim was presented. Ci~ing Goldstein, the Court stated: 
"Just as the States may exercise regulatory 
power over writings so may the States regulate 
with respect to discoveries. States may hold 
diverse viewpoints in pr6tecting intellectual 
property relating to invention as they do in 
protecting the intellectual property relating 
to the subject matter of copyright. The only 
limitation on the States is that in regulating 
the area of patents and copyrights they do not 
conflict with the operation of the laws in this 
area passed by Congress . . " 416 U.S., at 479. 
Although recognizing that the trade secret law resulted in 
preventing the public gaining certain information, the Court 
emphasized that the law had "a decidedly beneficial effect 
on society," id., at 485, and that without it, "organized 
scientific and technological research could become frag-
mented, and society, as a whole, would suffer~" Id., -at 
487. 
14/ "There can be no offense to the Constitution if 
the [media] is compelled to pay the fair value of what it has 
taken . . " Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First 
Zacchini footnotes -11-
Amendment, 76 Col. L. Rev. 1205, 1276 (1976) . . "More and more 
courts seem willing to acknowledge that plaintiffs who sue 
for . appropriation deserve damages not because they suffered 
some kind of severe mental distress but because the defendant 
used something which belonged to the plaintiff--his name or 
likeness--without compensation.'' . Pember and Teeter, Privacy 
in the Press Since Time v. Hill, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 57, 87 
(1974). 
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No. 76-577 
Hugo Zacchini, Petitioner, ) 
v. On Writ of Certiorari to the 
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[June -, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner, Hugo Zacchini, is an entertainer. He performs 
a "human cannonball" act in which he is shot from a cannon 
into a net some 200 feet away. Each performance occupies 
;ome 1.5 seconds. In August and September, 1972, petitioner 
was engaged to perform his act on a regular basis at the 
( {pauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. He performed in a 
ft• nced area, surrounded by grandstands, at the fair grounds. 
Members of the public attending the fair were not charged a 
separate admission fee to observe his act. 
On August 30, a freelance reporter for Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Company, the operator of a television broad-
casting station and respondent in this case, attended the fair. 
He carried a small movie camera. Petitioner noticed the 
reporter and asked him not to film the performance. The 
rP porter did not do so on that day; but on the instructions of 
the producer of respondent's daily newscast, he returned the 
following clay and videotaped the entire act. This film clip, 
approximately 15 seconds in length, was shown on the 11 
o 'cloek news program that night, together with favorable 
c·ommell tary .' 
1 T IH· ~<cript of the commentary accompanying the film clip read as 
l(lltow~ · 
··Thi" • • now . •. i::; the &ior of a tnre spectator sport • .. the sport 
~ - ?-77 
~ ..-. 
~ ZACCHINI v~ SC~IPfS-gOWAllp BROAPQASTINp CO: 
Petitioner then brou~ht this !i-Ction f9r dama~es, alleg.in~ 
that he is "engaged in the entertainment business," that the 
:tct he performs is one "invented by his father and ... per-
formed only by his family for the last 50 years," tha.t 
respondent "showed and commercialized the film of his act 
without his consent," and that such conduct was an "unlawful 
appropriation of plaintiff's professional property.'' App. 4-5. 
Respondent answered and moved for summary judgment, 
which was summarily granted by the trial court. 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. The majority held 
that petitioner's complaint stated a cause of action for conver-
sion and for infringement of a common law copyright, and 
one judge concurred in the judgment on the ground that the 
complaint stated a cause of action for appropriation of peti-
tioner's "right of publicity" in the film of his act. All three 
judges agreed that the First Amendment did not privilege the 
press to show the entire performance on a news program 
without compensating petitioner for any financial injury he 
·could prove at trial. 
Like the concurring judge in the Court of Appeals, the 
• 'upreme Court of Ohio rested petitioner's cause of action 
under state law on his "right to the publicity value of his 
performance." 47 Ohio St. 2d 224,- N. E. 2d- (1976). 
~rhe opinion Syllabus, to which we are to look for the rule of 
law used to decide the case/ declared first that one may not 
of human cannonballing . . . in fact, the great Zacchini is about the only 
human cannonball around, the::;e days .. . just happens that., where he is,, 
'" t hr Gn·a t 0Pauga County Fair, in Burt.on . .. and believe me, although 
1t 'o not. a long act, it's a thriller ... and you really need to see it in. 
pPn;on ... to a.ppreciate it. ... " (Emphasis in original.) App. 12. 
~ Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 93 n. 2 (1964); Perkirus v. Benguet Mining 
r'o .. 342 U. S. 437 441-443 , (1952); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 300 
l". S. 551, 554 (1940) . Srr Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17 (1967); 
ThP Williamson Heater Co . v. Radich, 128 Ohio St. 124 (1934); Thackery 
1 Helfrich. 123 Ohio St. 334, 336 '(1931); State v. Hauser, 101 Ohio St ... 
~:n.t , 40R. (192.0) ; 14 Ohio Jn.r.:. 2d §,247. . 
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use for his own benefit the name or likeness of another, 
whether or not the use or benefit is f1 commercial one, and 
second that respondent would be liable for the appropriation, 
over petitioner's objection and without license or privilege, of 
petitioner's right to the publicity value of his performance. 
!bid. The court nevertheless gave judgment for respondf!nt 
because, in the words of the Syllabus, 
" la] TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts 
matters of legitimate public interest which would other-
wise be protected by an individual's right of publicity, 
unlPss the actual intent of the TV station was to appro-
priate the benefit of the publicity for some nonprivileged 
private use, or unless the actual intent was to injure tpe 
individual." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1977) , to consider an 
issue unresolved by this Court: whether the First and Four-
teenth Amendments immunized respondent from damages for 
its alleged infringement of petitioner's state law 11ri~ht of 
publicity." Petition for Certiorari 2. Insof&r as the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution required juQgment 
for respondent, we reverse the judgment of that court. 
II 
If the judgment below rested on an independent and ade-
quate state ground, the writ of certiorari should be disinissed 
as improvidently granted. Wilson v. Lowes, 355 U. S. 597 
( 1958). for "our only power over state judgments is to correct 
them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal laws. 
A.lld our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise 
opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opin-
wn, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state 
court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review 
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion." 
HP-r/] v. Pitcairn, 324. U. S. 117, 125- 126 0945) . We are 
76-577-0PINION 
4 ZACCHINI v. SCRIPPS-HOWARD BROADCASTING CO. 
COllfident, however, that the Judgment below did not rest OI\ 
an adequate and independent state ground and that we have 
jurisdiction to decide the federal issue presented in this case. 
There is no doubt that petitioner's complaint was grounded 
in state law and that the right of publicity which petitioner 
was held to possess was a right under Ohio law. It is also 
clear that respondent's claim of constitutional privilege was 
sustained. The source of this privilege was not identified in 
the Syllabus. It is clear enough from the opinion of the Ohio 
Supreme Court, which we are permitted to consult for under-
standing of the Syllabus, Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 
U. S. 437, 442-443 (1952),3 that in adjudicatit1g the crubial 
question of whether respondent had a privilege to film and 
televise respondent's performance, the court turned immedi-
ately to Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967). It con-
a In Perkins the is;;ue was whether the Ohio courts could exercise per-
;:oual jurisdiction ovf.'r a foreign corporation. The Syllabus of the Ohio 
Supreme Court derlared that it did not. have per;;onal jurisdiction, but. it 
gave no indication of whether the Ohio court'~ decision rested on state 
grounds or on the Fourteenth Amendment. The only opinion filed with 
the Syllabus reasoned, however, that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. prohibited the Ohio courtl'i from exercising personal 
JUrisdiction in that ca.s<'. While recognilling the existence of the Ohio 
;:)~·llnbus rule, thi;: Court fPlt obliged in the;,e circumstances to reach the 
merit:; of the con;,tit.utiom1l i~;,;ue, holding that the Due Process Clause 
llid uot. preclude the exerci;,e of jurisdiction. "[F]or us to allow the 
JUdgment to :;tancl a;; it is would risk an affirmance of a decision which 
might have been decided differently if the court below had felt free, under 
our decisions, t.o do so." 342 U.S., at 443. 
The Ohio court~ do not. suggest tha.t the opinion is not relevant to a 
determination of the Ohio Supreme Court's holding. 
"The ;,yllabuti is the language of the court. The opinion is more 
particularly t.he language of the judge preparing the same, and yet so 
much of the opinion as is reasonably necessary to sustain the judgment 
must of necessity be concurred in by the court·." 
llart v . Andrews, 1o:3 Ohio St. 218, 221 (1921) (emphasis added). S~ 
:dso Willia~on Heater, supra; State v. Ha·user, supra. 
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strued the principle of that case, along with that of New York 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 374 (1964), to be that "the press 
has a privilege to report matters of legitimate publ\c interest 
even though such reports might intrude on matters otherwise 
private," and concluded, therefore, that the press is also 
11 privileged when an individual seeks to publicly exploit his 
talents while keeping the benefits private." 47 Ohio St. 2d, 
at 234, - N. E. 2d. at -. The privilege thus exists in 
cases "where the appropriation of the right of publicity is 
claimed." The court's opinion a.Iso referred to Draft 21 of 
the relevant portion of Restatement of Torts Second, which 
was understood to make room for reasonable press ~ppropria­
tions by limiting the reach of the right of privacy r~ther than 
by creating a privileged invasion. The opinion said, however, 
that "the gravamen of the issue in this case is not whether the 
degree of intrusion is reasonable but whether First Amend-
ment prine--iples require that the right of privacy gives way to 
the public right to be informed of matters of public interest 
and concern. The concept of privilege seems the more useful 
and appropriate one." ld., at 234 n. 5.,- N. E. 2d, at-. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The controlling consideration was thus one of privilege 
rather tha.n of the substantive reach of the right of publicity. 
In deciding the question, had the Ohio court rested on both 
state and federal grounds, either of which would have been 
dispositive. we would have had no jurisdiction. Fox Films v. 
Mueller, 296 U. S. 207 (1935); Enterprise Irrigation District 
v. Farmers Mutual Canal Company, 243 U.S. 157 164 (1917). 
But the opinion. like the Syllabus, did not mention the Ohio 
Constitution, citing instead this Court's First Amendment 
eases as controlling. It appears to us that decision was rested 
solely on federal grounds. That the Ohio court might havey 
but rlid not. invoke state law does not foreclose jurisdiction 
here. Steel v. L&f..: R . Co., 323 U. S. 192, 197 n. 1 (1944); 
lndiGna ex rel. Ander::wn v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 98 (1938). 
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If the judgment in favor of respondent must nevertheless be 
understood as ultimately resting on Ohio law, it appears that 
at the very least the Ohio court felt compelled by what it 
understood to be federal constitutional considerations to con-
strue and apply its own law in the manner it did. In this 
event, we have jurisdiction and should decide the federal 
issue; for if the state court erred in its understanding of our 
·cases and of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, we should 
so declare, leaving the state court free to decide the privilege 
issue solely as a matter of Ohio law. Perkins v. Benguet 
Mining Co., supra. "If the Supreme Court [of Ohio] held as 
it did because it felt under compulsion of federal law as 
enunciated · by this Court so to hold, it should be relieved of 
that compulsion. It should be freed ·to decide these suits 
according to its own local law." Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 
u s. 1, 5 (1950) . 
III 
The Ohio Supreme Court held tha.t respondent is constitu-
tionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public 
interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of 
publicity, absent an intent to irijure or to appropriate for 
:5ome nonprivileged purpose. If under this standard respond-
ent had merely reported that petitioner was performing at the 
fair and described or commented on his act, with or without 
howing his picture on television , we would have a very dif-
ferent case. But petitioner is not contending that his appear-
arlee at the fair and his performance could not be reported by 
the press as newsworthy items. His complaint is that 
respondent filmed his entire act and displayed that film on 
television for the public to see and enjoy. This, he claimed, 
was an appropriation of his professional property. The Ohio 
Supreme Court agreed that petitioner had "a right of pub-
licity" that gave him "personal control over the commercial 
display and exploitation of his personality and the exercise of 
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his talents." 4 This right of "exclusive control over the pub-
licity given to his performance" was said to be such a "valu-
able part of the benefit which may be attained by his talents 
and efforts" that it was entitled to legal protection. It was 
also observed, or at least expressly assumed, that petitioner 
had not abandoned his rights by performing under the cir-
cumstances present at the Geauga County Fair Grounds. 
The Ohio Supreme Court nevertheless held that the chal-
lenged invasion was privileged, saying that the press "must be 
accorded broad latitude in its choice of how much it presents 
of each story or incident, and of the emphasis to be given to 
such presentation. No fixed standard which would bar the 
press from reporting or depicting either an entire occurrence 
or an entire discrete part of a public performance to be 
formulated which would not unduly restrict the 'breathing 
room' in reporting which freedom of the press requires." 47 
Ohio St., at 235, - N. E. 2d, at -. Under this view, 
respondent was thus constitutionaUy free to film and display 
petitioner's entire act.5 
1 The court rrlied on Hou$h v. Peth, 165 Ohio St.. 35, 133 N. E. 2d 340 
(1956), the Syllabu::; of which held: 
' ·An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is the unwarranted 
appropria.tion or exploitation of one'::; per::;onality, the publicizing of one's 
private affair::; with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the 
wrongfu l intrusion into one's private activities in such a manner as to 
outrage or cam;e mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person or 
ordina ry sensibilitie~." 
The court also indicnted that the applicable principles of Ohio law were 
those set out in Restatement. of Torts Second, Tentative Dra.ft No. 13, 
1967, § 252c, and the commrnt;:; thrreto, portions of which were stated in 
thr footnote;:; of thr opinion. Also, referring to the right a;,; the " right of 
publicity," the rourt quoted approvingly from Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, luc ., 202 F. 2d 866,868 (CA2) (1952). 
r, Thr court.';,; explication wa.,; ns follows: 
'Tho proper :-;tundard must ll(•ce;,;sarily be whether the matters reported 
were of public intere:;t, and if so, the preti8 will be liable for appropriation 
\If a rwrformcr'» right of publicit.y only if its actual intent was not w 
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The Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, supra, but that· case does not mandate a media privilege 
to televise a performer's entire act without his consent. 
Involved in Time, Inc. v. Hill was a claim under the New ~ 
York "Right of Privacy" statutefi\that Life Magazine, in the 
course of reviewing a new play, had connected the play with a 
long-past incident involving petitioner and his family and had 
falsely described their experience and conduct at that time. 
The complaint sought damages for humiliation and suffering 
flowing from these nondefamatory falsehoods that allegedly 
invaded Hill's privacy. The Court held, however, that the 
opening of a new play linked to an actual incident was a 
matter of public interest and that Hill could not recover with-
out showing that the Life report was knowingly false or was 
published with reckless disregard for the truth-the same 
rigorous standarcl that had been applied in New York Times 
v. Sullivan, supra. 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, which was hotly contested and decided 
by a divided court, involved an entirely different tort than 
the "right of publicity" recognized by the Ohio Supreme 
Court. As the opinion reveals in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court 
was steeped in the literature of privacy law and was aware of 
the developing distinctions and nuances in this branch of the 
law. The Court, for example, cited Prosser, Handbook ofthe 
report the p<>rformance, but, rather, to appropriate the performance for 
~omc other private tt:-;e, or if the actual intent was to injure the performer .. 
[t might, also be the cn~<> that the pre,.;s would be liable if it reckle&'Sly 
dbTegarded contract rights existing between the plaintiff and a third 
per~on to present the performance to th<> public, but that questjon is 
not pr~£>ntro lwr£> ." 47 Ohio St., at 2:~5,- X E. 2d, at-. 
0 S£>ct.ion 51 of the New York Civil Hight,; Law provides an action for· 
injtmeuon and damages for inva.:;ion of the "right of privacy" granted by 
§50: 
' 'A p<>rson, firm or corporation tha.t uses for advertising purposes, or for· 
the purpo;;<>;; of trade, the name, portrait. or picture of any living person· 
without luwing fir:;t obtoflined th£> written consent of such person, or if a. 
w.inot Qf his 01;, hf'r earent. 0~ gunrd.ian, is ~t,tilty of a misdemeanor." 
... 
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Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) , and the same author's well-known 
article, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1000) , both of which 
divided privacy into four distinct branches.7 The Court was 
aware that it was adjudicating a "false light" privacy case 
involving a matter of public interest, not a case ipvolving 
"intrusion," 385 U. S. , at 384-385, n. 9, "appropriation" of a 
name or likeness for the purposes of trade, id., at 381, or 
11 private details" apoutinon-newsworthy person or event, id., 
at 383 n. 7. It is also abundantly clear that TiTM, Inc. v. 
Hill did not involve a performer, a person with a np.me having 
commercial value, or any claim to a "right of publicit'y." This 
rliscretc kind of "appropriation" case WllS plamly identified in 
the literature cited by the Court 8 and had been adjudicated 
in the reported cases.9 
7 ·'The law of privacy compri~es four distinct kinds of invasiop. of four 
di fferent intNeot~ of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common 
name, hu t ot.herwise have a.lmo~t nothing in common except that each 
reprr;;('nts an interference wit.h the right of the plaintiff." Prosser, 
Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960) . Thus, according to Prosser, 
some court:; had recognized a cauoe of action for " intrusion" upon the 
plnintiff ':; ~eclu sion or solitude; public disclosure of "private facts" about. 
llw plain t iff'~ per:sonal life ; publicity that places the plaintiff in a "false 
li )l:ht " in the public eye; nnd "appropriation" of the plaintiff's name or 
likene.-'s for comm('rcial purpo:ses. One may be liable for "appropriation" 
J!' he '' pirate [s] the pla intiff '~ ideutity for some advantage of his own." 
..J.8 Cali f. L . Rev ., at. 403. 
8 S('e, fo r exampl(', Prosser, Torts, 3rd Ed. 842 (1964); Bloustein, 
Privacy a~> an Aspect of Human Dignity ; An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 962, 986- 991 (1964) ; Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-
Were Wnrren and Brandei:; Wrong?, 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 
:326, 331 (1966) . 
" E. g .. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp ., 229 F. 2d 481 
(CA3 1956 ) ; Sharkey v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 93 F . Supp. 986 
(~DNY 1950) ; PittsburrJh Athletic Co. v. KQV BroadcG.$ting Co., 24 F. 
Supp. 490 (1938); Twentieth Centw·y Sporting Club, Inc. v. Tmnsradio 
Press Service, Inc., 165 Mi:::c. 71, 30 N . Y. S. 159 (1937); Hogan v. A. S. 
Harnes ,~ Co., 114 U. S. P . L. Q, 314 (Pa . Ct. C. P . 1957); Myers v. 
l.i .S. Camera P'!J,.blis.hing Co.rp ., 167 N. Y. S . 2d 771, City Ct. of Cit.y of 
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The differences between these two torts are important. 
First, the State's interests in providing a cause of action in 
each instance are different. "The interest protected" in per-
mitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light "is 
clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental 
'distress as in defamation." Prosser, supra, 48 Calif. L. Rev., 
at 400. By contrast, the State's interest in permitting a "right 
of publicity" is in protecting the proprietary interest of the 
individual in his act in part to encourage such entertain-
ment.10 As we later note, the State's interest is closely 
N.Y. (1957). The cases prior to 1961 are helpfully reviewed in Gordon, 
I~ight of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 
N. W. U. L. Rev. 553 (1960). 
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., supra, involved a chal-
lenge to television exhibition of a film made of a. prize fight that had 
occurred some time ago. Judge Biggs, writ-ing for the Court. of Appea.Is, 
said at 229 F. 2d 486, 490: 
"There are, speaking very generally, two polar types of cases. One 
arises when some accidental occurrence rends the veil of obscurity sur-
rounding an average person and makes him, arguable, newsworthy. The 
other type involves the appropriation of the performance or production 
of a. professional performer or entrepreneur. Between the two extremes 
are many gradations, most involving strictly commercial exploitation of 
some aspect of an individual's personality, such as his name or picture. 
"The fact. is that, if a performer performs for hire, a curhdlment., without 
consideration, of his right to control his performance is a wrong to him. 
Such a. wrong vitally affects his livelihood, precisely as a trade libel, for 
example, affects the earnings of a corporation. If the artistry of the 
performance be used as a criterion, every judge perforce must turn 
himself into a literary, theatrical or sports critic." 
10 The Ohio Supreme Court expressed the view "that plaintiff's claim 
i,.: one for invasion of the right of privacy by appropriation, a.nd should 
be considered as such." 47 Ohio St., at. 226, - N. E. 2d, at -. It 
..;hould be noted, however, that the case before us is more limited than 
the broad category of law~;uit::; that may arise undE'r the heading of 
·'appropriatioi1.'' Petitioner does not merely assert that some general use. 
l:fQ.ch a~; advertising, was made oi his name or likeness; he relies on the 
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analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing 
on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his 
endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or 
reputation. Second, the two torts differ in the degree to 
which they intrude on dissemination of information to the 
public. In "false light" cases the only way to protect the 
interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the 
damaging matter, while in "right of publicity" cases the only 
question is who gets to do the publishing. An entertainer 
such as petitioner usually has no objection to the widespread 
publication of his act as long as he gets the commercial benefit 
of such publication. Indeed, in the present case petitioner 
did not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his act; he simply 
sought compensation for the broadcast in the form of 
damages. 
Nor does it appear that our later cases, such as Rosenbloom 
v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974); and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 
U. S. 448 (1976), require or furnish substantial support for 
the Ohio court's privilege ruling. These cases, like New York 
Times, emphasize the protection extended to the press by the 
First Amendment in defamation cases, particularly when suit 
is brought by a public official or a public figure. None of 
them involve an alleged appropriation by the press of a right 
of publicity existing under state law. 
Moreover, Time, Inc. v. Hill, New York Times, Metromedia, 
Gertz, and Firestone all involved the reporting of events; in 
none of them was there an attempt to broadcast or publish 
an entire act for which the performer ordinarily gets paid. It 
is evident, and there is no claim here to the contrary, that 
petitioner's state-law right of publicity would not serve to 
prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts about 
much nanower cla.im that . n•:-:pondenL televised an entire act tha.t he 
orcuna.rily gets paid to pcrfonn. 
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petitioner's act.11 Wherever the line in particular situations 
is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and 
those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they 
broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent. ·The 
Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring respond-
ent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on 
television than it would privilege respondent to film and 
broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the 
copyright owner, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et. seq., cf. Kalem Co. v. 
Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911); Manners v. Morosoo, 252 
U. S. 317 ( 1920), or to film and broadcast a prize fight, Ettore 
v. Philco 'Pelev·ision Broadcasting Corp., 229 F. 2d 481 (CA3 
1956) . or a baseball game. Pittsb'urgh Athletic Co. v. KQV 
Rroadcal5tiog Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (WD Pa. 1938), where the 
promoters or the participants had other ·plans for publicizing 
the event. There are ample reasons for reaching this 
conclusion. 
The broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a 
11 Pro~~er, Torts, -lt.h Ed. (1971), 806-807, generalizes on the cases: 
' 'Th<> ~<>w York eourt~ were faced very earl~· with the obvious fact that 
J\l'W!:iJl1tpt•r::; and magazirH',.;, to ~ay nothing of radio, television and motion 
picture,.;, an' by no mt•an~ philant.hropir institution~;, but. are operated for 
prollt . A,; agHin::;t . the cont<·ntion that everything published by these 
agl'Hl'it•" tuu"t nrre::;.~aril~ · be 'for purpo~;r::; of trade,' they were compelled 
to hold Uwt tl1en · mus1 be ::;ome clo::;er and morr direct connection, beyond 
the nwre fact that the 1\ t'W>'JlHJler ibelf i,; "old; and that t.he presence of 
<tdvrrti~ing Ill a ttl:' I' in adjacent column::;, or r.ven the duplication of a news 
item for t.Jw JHtrpo~P of Hdvertising the publication itself, does not make 
auy ditfrn·uce . An~· otlwr conclu::;ion would in all probability have been 
an uneol\~titutional illl('rfc•retlCP wirh the frrc•dom of the press. Accord-
ing!~ ·, i 1 ha . ; brru hc,ld that t lw mere incident a I ment.ion of the plainWf's 
Jwme in a book or a mut iou pic-ture i:< not a.n iuvasion of his priva-cy; nor 
1" the publil'ation of :1 photo)!raph or a, new:;reel in which he incidentally 
:tppt'ar,.: ." (Foot notP,; omi1 i.ed .) 
l'ompan· Auwric·a n La\\· lu~titut <:', He::>lalcmeJll of the Law Second, Tenta,. 
[ 1\T Drafi ~o . 12, ~ tii>:!e, Comn ten(, D. 
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substantial threat to the economic value of that performance. 
As the Ohio court recognized, this act is the product of peti-
tioner's own talents and energy, the end result of much time, 
effort and expense. Much of its economic value lies in the 
"right of exclusive control over the publicity given to his 
performance"; if the public can see the act for free on televi-
sion they will be Jess willing to pay to see it at the fair. 12 The 
effect of a public broadcast of the performance is similar to 
preventing petitioner from charging an admission fee. "The J 
rationale for [protecting the right of publicitW"s the straight-
forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of 
good will. No social purpose is served by having the defend-
ant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have 
market value and for which he would normally pay." Kalven, 
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 
Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 331 (1966). More-
over, the broadcast of petitioner's entire performance, unlike 
the unauthorized use of another's name for the purposes of 
trade or the inpidental use of a name or picture by the press, 
goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an 
entertainer. Thus in this case, Ohio has recognized what may 
be the strongest case for a "right of publicity"-involving not 
the appropriation of au entertainer's reputation to ephance 
the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropria-
tion of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his 
reputation in the first place. 
Of course, Ohio's decision to protect petitioner's right of 
publicity here rests on more than a desire to compensate the 
performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the 
l 2 It is possible, of course, that respondent's news broadca;;t increased 
the value of petitioner's performance by stimulating the public's interest 
in seeing t.he act live . In thrt<e circumstances, petitioner would not be 
able to prove damages and tllll:,; would not. recover. But petitioner has 
alleged that the broadca~t mjurPd him to the extent of $25,000, App. 5, 
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protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the 
investment required to produce a performance of interest to 
the public. This same consideration underlies the patent a.nd 
copyright laws long enforced by this Court. As the Court 
stated in Mazer v. Stein, 34-7 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), 
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empower-
ing Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfa.re 
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science 
and· useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such cre-
ative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the 
services rendered." 
These laws perhaps regard the "reward to the owner as 
secondary consideration," United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948), but they were "intended 
definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights" in order to 
afford greater encouragement to the production of works of 
benefit to the public. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. 
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939). The Constitution does not 
prevent Ohio from making a similar choice here in deciding to 
[>rotect the entertainer's incentive in order to encourage the 
production of this type of work for public benefit. Cf. 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546 (1973); Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 476 (1974).ta 
"' Goldstmt mvolved u. California. statute outlawing " record piracy"-t.he 
llllHnthorized duplication of recording::; of 11erformances by major musical 
a r, i::;t:,;. Pt•t it ion en; t hrrr launched a mult ifacet.ed constitutional attack 
on the stat ute, but they did not argue that the statute violated the First 
Amendment. In rejecting this broad-ba:;ed constitutional attack, this: 
Court ronrluded : 
·The Ca liforma statutor~· ~cheme evidences a legi:;lative policy to prohibit 
tap<' piracy ' and 'record pmiCy,' conduct that may adversely affect. the 
continuru production of nrw recording:;, a large industry in California. 
Arr01:dipgly, thr Statr lw s, Qy :;tntute, gi.veu to recordings the at.tributes; 
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There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, 
enjoys First Amendment protection. It is also true that 
t'ntertainment itself can be important news. Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, supra. But it is important to note that neither the 
public nor respondent will be deprived of the benefit of peti-
tioner's performance as long as his commercial stake in his 
act is appropriately recognized. Petitioner does not seek to 
<>njoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply wants to 
be paid for it. Nor do we think that a state-law damages 
remedy against respondent would represent a species of lia-
bility without fault contrary to the letter or spirit of Gertz, 
supra. Respondent knew exactly that petitioner objected to 
televising his act, but nevertheless displayed the en tire film. 
We conclude, as have others,t• that although the State of 
.>f property. No restraint has been p'la.ced on the use of an idea o1· 
concept; rather, petitioners and other individuals in precisely the same 
compensation." Pember and Teeter, Privacy in the Press Since Time v. 
Hill, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 57,87 (1974). 
In Kewanee this Court upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's trade 
~rrret. law, although again no First. Amendment claim was presented. 
Cit.ing GoldstPin. the Court stated: 
' '.Tu:;t as the State:; may exPrci:;e regulatory power owr writings so ma.y 
1 he State;; regllht.te with rP.spect to discoveries. States ma.y hold diverse 
virwpoint:; in protecting intellectual property relating to invention as they 
do in protecting the intellectual property rrlating to the subject matter 
of copyright. Tlw only limit·a.tion on the States is that. in regulating the 
area of patent:; nud copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of 
the laws in thi:; area pa.ssed by Congre.ss .... " 416 U. S., at 479. 
Although rrcognizing thnt the trade ;;ecret law resulted in preventing the 
public gaining certain information, the Court emphasized tha.t. the law 
hnd '' a decidedly beneficial effect. on society," id., at 485, and that without 
it , ·'organized J'Cientifir and technological research could become frag-
mPntrd, and society, a;; a wholP, would suffPr." /d., at 487. 
11 "There can be no offpn~P to t.he Constitution if the [media] is com-
prlled to pay tlw fair value of what it has taken .... " Hill, Defamation 
and Privacy Undrr the First Amendment, 76 Col. L. Rev. 1205, 1276 
( 19i(i) •· .\Ion' and more courts seem willing to acknowledge that· plain-
uff,.; whQ ,.;ur for appropriation de:;erve damage~ not becau::;e they suffered 
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Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the 
circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not require it to do so. 
Reversed. 
some kind of severe mental distress but because the defendant. ·Used some-
th ing which belonged to the plaintiff-his name or likeneso-without 
mHnner and with the same personnel as appeared on the original 
recording. 
" Until and unless Congl'ess takes further action with respect to record-
ings ... , the California statute may be enforced against acts of piracy 
-;uch as those which occurred in the present case." 412 U. S., at 571. 
(Emphasi;; added.) 
We note that federal district courts have rejected First Amendment 
challenges to the federal copyright Jaw on the ground that "no restraint 
has been placed on the use of an idea or concept." United States v. 
Bodin, ;375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (SD Okla. 1974). See also Walt Disney 
Productions v. Air Pimtes. 3'45 F. Supp. 108, 115 (ND Cal. 1972) (cit.ing 
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment . Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Pres;, 17 U.S. L.A. L. Rev. 1180 (1970), arguing that. copy-
nght law does not abridge the First Amendment because it does not 
rc;;t rain the communication of id<'as or concepts); Robe1·t Stigwood Group, 
Ltd. v. O'Reilly~ 346 F . Supp. :376 (Conn. 1972) (also relying on Nimmer) . 
Of course this <':ll:l<~ does not. make a claim that. respondents would be 
prevrnted by !WI itioner':s " right of publicity" from ~;taging or filming its 
own '' human cannonbtdl" act 
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MR . .JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner, Hugo Zacchini, is an entertainer. He performs 
a "human cannonball" act in which he is shot from a cannon 
mto a net some 200 feet away. Each performance occupies 
some 1.5 seconds. In August and September, 1972, petitioner 
was enga.ged to perform his act on a regular basis at the 
Uf'auga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. He performed in a 
ft' llced area, surrounded by grandstands, at the fair grounds. 
Members of the public attending the fair were not charged a 
separate admission fee to observe his act. 
On August 30, a freelance reporter for Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Company, the operator of a television broad-
casting station and respondent in this case, attended the fair. 
He carried a small movie camera. Petitioner noticed the 
reporter and asked him not to film the performance. The 
rP porter did not do so ou that day; but on the instructions of 
the producer of respondent's daily newscast , he returned the 
followinp; day and videotaped the entire act. This film clip, 
approximately 15 seconds in length, was shown on the 11 
o 'cloek news program that night, together with favorable 
<'ommeutary.1 
t The «eript of the commentary accompanying the film clip read as 
1ollows : 
"T!u" • • now • • . i:; the 1>ior;. of a true spectator sport • . . the sport 
7ft-57r:-:0PHfiON 
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Petitioner then brou~ht this ~ction f9r dama~es, allegin~ 
that he i~ "engaged in the entertainment business," that the 
act he performs is one "invented by his father and ... per-
formed only by his family for the last 50 years," that 
respondent 11showed and commercialized the film of his act 
without his consent," and that such conduct was an "unlawful 
appropriation of plaintiff's professional property." App. 4-5. 
Respondent answered and moved for summary judgment, 
which was summarily granted by the trial court. 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. The majority held 
that petitioner's complaint stated a cause of action for conver-
sion and for infringement of a common law copyright, and 
one judge concurred in the judgment on the ground that the 
complaint stated a cause of action for appropriation of peti-
tioner's "right of publicity" in the film of his act. All three 
judges agreed that the First Am.endment did not privilege the 
press to show the entire performance on a news program 
without compensating petitioner for any financial injury he 
could prove at trial. 
Like the concurring judge in the Court of Appeals, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio rested petitioner's cause of action 
under state law on his "right to the publicity value of his 
performance." 47 Ohio St. 2d 224,- N. E. 2d- (1976). 
'The opinion Syllabus, to which we are to look for the rule of 
law used to decide the case, 2 declared first that one may not 
of human ca.nnonballing ... in fact., the gn•at Zacchini is about the only 
human cannonball around, the:;e days .. . just happens tha.t., where he is,, 
1>-< the Grrat Geauga County Fair, in Burt.on . .. and believe me, a.lthough 
11 ',: not. a long a.rt, it':; a thriller .. . and you really need to see it in. 
pPnson ... to appreciate it ... . " (Emphasis in original.) App. 12. 
t Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89,93 n. 2 (1964); Perkins v. Benguet Mining 
'C'o .. 342 U. S. 437 441-44:3 1 (1952); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., :300 
\'. S. 551, 554 (1940) . Sre Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17 (1967); 
The Williamson Heater Co . v. Radich, 128 Ohio St. 124 (1934); Thackery 
1 Helfrich. 123 Ohio St. 334, :3:36 (1931); State v. Hauser, 101 Ohio St •. 
~n~ . 408. ( 1no) ; 14 Ohio Jnx. 2d §, 247: . 
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use for his own benefit the name or likeness of another, 
whether or not the use or benefit is fL commercial one, and 
second that respondent would be liable for the appropriation, 
over petitioner's objection and without license or privilege, of 
petitioner's right to the publicity value of his performance. 
!bid. The court nevertheless gave judgment for respond~nt 
because, in the words of the Syllabus, 
" [a] TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts 
matters of legitimate public interest which would other-
wise be protected by an individual's right of publicity, 
unless the actual intent of the TV station was to appro-
priate the benefit of the publicity for some nonprivileged 
private use , or unless the actual intent was to injure the 
individual." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari, - U. S.- (1977) , to consider an 
issue unresolved by this Court: whether the First and Four-
teenth Amendments immunized respondent from damages for 
its alleged infringement of petitioner's state law "right of 
publicity." Petition for Certiorari 2. Insofl;l-r as the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution required juqgment 
for respondent, we reverse the judgment of that court. 
II 
If the judgment below rested on an independent and ade-
quate state ground, the writ of certiorari should be dismissed 
as improvidently granted. Wilson v. Lowes, 355 U. S. 597 
( 1958). for "our only power over state judgments is to correct 
them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal laws .. 
And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise 
opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opin-
10 11 , and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state 
court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our ~eview 
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion." 
Hp,r{] v. Pitca.irn, 324 U. S. 117, 125-126 0945) . We p,re 
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co11fident. however, that the judgment below did not rest on 
an adequate and independent state ground and that we have 
jurisdiction to decide the federal issue presented in this case. 
There is no doubt that petitioner's complaint was grounded 
.in state law and that the right of publicity which petitioner 
was held to possess was a right under Ohio law. It is also 
clear that respondent's claim of constitutional privilege was 
sustained. The source of this privilege was not identified in 
the Syllabus. It is clear enough from the opinion of the Ohio 
Supreme Court, which we are permitted to consult for under-
standing of the Syllabus, Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 
U. S. 437, 442-443 (1952),~ that in adjudicating the crucial 
question of whether respondent had a privilege to film and 
televise respondent's performance, the court turned immedi-
ately to Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967). It con-
~In Perkins the is;,;ue was whether the Ohio courts could exercise per-
;,;mwl jurisdiction over a foreign corponttion. The Syllabus of the Ohio 
Suprt>me Court dt>rlared tha.t it did not have prr;;onal jurisdiction, but it 
gavt> no indication of whether the Ohio court'~ decision rested on state 
ground::; or on tlw Fourteenth Amendment. Thr only opinion filed with 
the Syllabus rea<;oned, however, that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
trenth Amendment. prohibitrd the Ohio court.~ from exercising personal 
JUrisdiction in thH1. rase. While rrcogni11ing the existence of the Ohio 
;o:)yllabus rule, thi~o~ Court felt obliged ·in the~'<P circumstances to rea.ch the 
merit~ of the com;titution<d i;;sue, holding that the Due Process Clause 
thd not preclude the t>xerci::;e of jurisdiction . '' [F]or us to allow the 
Judgment to ;;tancl a.~ it i::; would risk an affirmance of a decision which 
might have been decided differently if the court below ha.d felt free, under 
our deci:;ions, t.o do so." 342 U.S., a.t 443. 
The Ohio court,; do not ;;ugge:;t tha.t the opinion is not. relevant to a. 
dt>termination of the Ohio Supreme Court';; holding. 
"The ::;yllabu::; is the language of the court. The opinion is more 
particular!~· t.he lan!);uagP of the judge preparing the same, and yet so 
much of the opinion a.~ is reasonably necessary to S'ustain the judgment 
m.·ust of necessity be concurred in by t/!e court·." 
1/art v. Andreu•s, 103 Ohio St. 218, 221 (1921) (emphasis a.dded). S~ 
:d:-;o Willia'/nijon Heater, supra; .';tate v. Ha'user, supra. 
... 
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strued the principle of that case, along with that of New York 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 374 (1964), to be that "the press 
has a privilege to report matters of legitimate publ\c interest 
even though such reports might intrude on matters otherwise 
private," and concluded, therefore, that the press is also 
"privileged when an individual seeks to publicly exploit his 
talents while keeping the benefits private." 47 Ohio St. 2d, 
at 234, - N. E. 2d. at -. The privilege thus exists in 
cases "where the appropriation of the right of publicity is 
claimed." The court's opinion a.lso referred to Draft 21 of 
the relevant portion of Restatement of Torts Second, which 
was understood to make room for reasonable press ~ppropria­
tions by limiting the reach of the right of privacy rather than 
by creating a privileged invasion. The opinion said. however, 
that "the gravamen of the issue in this case is not whether the 
degree of intrusion is reasonable but whether First Amend-
ment principles require that the right of privacy gives way to 
the public right to be informed of matters of public interest 
and concern. The concept of privilege seems the more useful 
and appropriate one." ld., at 234 11. 5., - N. E. 2d, at--. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The controlling consideratio11 was thus one of privilege 
rather than of the substantive reach of the right of publicity. 
In tleciding the question, had the Ohio court rested on both 
state and federal grounds, either of which would have been 
dispositive. we would have had no jurisdiction. Fox Films v. 
Mueller, 296 U. S. 207 (1935); Enterprise Irrigation District 
v. Fanners .Mutual Canal Company, 243 U.S. 157 164 (1917). 
But the opinion. like the Syllabus, did not mention the Ohio 
Constitution, citing instead this Court's First Amendment 
eases as controlling. It appears to us that decision was rested 
solely on federal grounds. That the Ohio court might have~ 
but did not. invoke state law does not foreclose jurisdiction 
here. Steel v. L&l'·: R . Co., 323 U. S. 192, 197 n. 1 ( 1944); 
lndiau« ex rel. Anderson v. Br«nd, 303 U.S. 95,98 (1938) . 
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If the judgment in favor of respondent must nevertheless be 
understood as ultimately resting on Ohio law, it appears that 
at the very least the Ohio court felt compelled by what it 
understood to be federal constitutional considerations to con-
·strue and apply its own law in the manner it did. In this 
event, we have jurisdiction and should decide the federal 
issue; for if the state court erred in its understanding of our 
·cases and of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, we should 
so declare, leaving the state court free to decide the privilege 
issue solely as a matter of Ohio law. Perkins v. Benguet 
Mining Co., supra. "If the Supreme Court [of Ohio] held as 
it did becaw:;e it felt under compulsion of federal law as 
enunciated · by this Court so to hold, it should be relieved of 
that compulsion. It should be freed to decide these suits 
according to its own local law." Missouri v. Mayfield, 340 
u.s. 1, 5 (1950) . 
III 
The Ohio Supreme Court held that respondent is constitu-
tionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public 
interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of 
publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for 
!:iOtne nonprivileged purpose. If under this standard respond-
ent had merely reported that petitioner was performing at the 
fair and described or commented on his act, with or without 
howing his picture on television, we would have a very dif-
ferent case. But petitioner is not contending that his appea~­
ance at the fair and his performance could not be reported by 
the press as newsworthy items. His complaint is tha 
respondent filmed his entire act and displayed that film on 
television for the public to see and enjoy. This, he claimed, 
was an awropriat_im1 of his professional property. The Ohio· 
Supreme Court agreed that petitioner had "a right of pub-
ltcity" that gave him "personal control over the commercial 
display and exploitation of his personality and the exercise of 
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his talents." 4 This right of "exclusive control over the p\lb-
1icity given to his performance" was said to be such a "valu-
able part of the benefit which may be attained by his talents 
and efforts" that it was entitled to legal protection. It was 
also observed, or at least expressly assumed, that petitioner 
had not abandoned his rights by performing under the cir-
cumstances present at the Geauga County Fair Grounds. 
The Ohio Supreme Court nevertheless held that the chal-
lenged invasion was privileged, saying that the press "must be 
accorded broad latitude in its choice of how much it presents 
of each story or incident, and of the emphasis to be given to 
such presentation. No fixed standard which would bar the 
press from reporting or depicting either an entire occurrence 
or an entire discrete part of a public performance to be 
formulated which would not unduly restrict the 'breathing 
room' in reporting which freedom of the press requires." 47 
Ohio St .. at 235, - N. E. 2d, at -. Under this view, 
respondent was thus constitutionally free to film and display 
petitioner's ~.~ 
'Thr court rrlied on Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St.. 35, 133 N. E. 2d 340 
(1956), the Syllabu:-; of which held: 
' 'An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is the unwarranted 
:1ppropriation or exploitation of one'::; per::;onality, the publicizing of one's 
private affair::> with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the 
wrongful intrul:'ion into one'~; private activities in such a manner as to 
outragr or cauor mental ;;uffering, ~;hame or humiliation to a person or 
ordinary oensibilitir:s." 
Th(• court abo indicflted that the applicable principles of Ohio law were 
t·hose ~;et out in Hc:>tatemrnt of Torts Second, Tentative Draft No. 13, 
1967, § 252c, and the commrnts thereto, portions of which were stated in 
thr footnotP::; of thr opinion. Al;;o, referring to the right as the "right of 
publicity," the court quoted approvingly from Haelan Labomtories, Inc. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, luc .. 202 F. 2d 866,868 (CA2) (1952). 
'' ThP court!;; explication wa.,; a.~ follows: 
·The proprr >"f nuda rd must nece;;::;arily be whether the matters reported 
wrr<:' of public inh·rr:>t, and if so, the pres;; will be liable for appropriation 
l•f a rwrformer'" right of puhlirity only if its a.ct.ual intent was not to 
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The Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, supra, but that· case does not mandate a meclia privilege 
to televise a_ p~_me~nti~ act without his consent. 
Involved in Ttriie, Inc. v. Hill was a claim under the New .f.) 
York "Right of Privacy" statu~that Life Magazine, in the 
course of reviewing a new play, had connected the play with a 
long-past incident involving petitioner and his family and had 
falsely described their experience and conduct at that time. 
The complaint sought damages for humiliation and suffering 
flowing from these nondefamatory falsehoods that allegedly 
invaded Hill's privacy. The Court held, however, that the 
opening of a new play linked to an actual incident was a 
matter of public interest and that Hill could not recover with-
out showing that the Life report was knowingly false or was 
published with reckless disregard for the truth-the same· 
rigorous standarq that had been applied in New York Times 
v. Sullivan, supra. 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, which was hotly contested and decided 
by a divided court, involved an entirely different tort than 
the "right of publicity" recognized by the Ohio Supreme 
Court. As the opinion reveals in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court 
was steeped in the literature of privacy law and was aware of 
the developing distinctions and nuances in this branch of the 
law. The Court, for example, cited Prosser, Handbook ofthe 
report tlw perfonrumcr, but , rather, to appropriate the performance for 
,.:orne othrr private u,.;e, or if the actual intent was to injure the performer. 
rt might, al:;o be tlw case tha t the prcNS would be liable if it reckle:,1;ly 
d i ~ rega rded contract rights existing between the plaintiff and a third 
prrson to present the performance to tht> public, but that quest,ion is 
not prr:;rntro hrrr." 47 Ohio St. , a t 2:~5,- ~ . E . 2d, at-. 
H Section 51 of t he New York Civil Hight ,.: Law provides an action for· 
mjuncuon and damages fo r inva;;ion of the " right of privacy" granted by 
§50: 
'·A person, firm or corporation tha t uses for advertising purposes, or for· 
1hr pmpo;;t>s of tra de, the name, portrait. or picture of any living person· 
without ha.ving firi<t obt<linrd the written consent of such person, or if a. 
'.J'I.inot: (~f hi,.: or. her T?:-t rent or: ~ua rd.ia n , is ~~·ilt y of a misdemeanor." 
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Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), and the same author's well-known 
article, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960), both of which 
divided privacy into four distinct branches. 7 The Court was 
aware that it was adjudicating a "false light" privacy case 
involving a matter of public interest, not a case involving 
"intrusion," 385 U. S., at 384--385, n. 9, "atJpropriation" of a 
name or likeness for the purposes of trade, id., at 381, or 
''private details" aboutJ:non-news-worthy person or event, id., 
at 383 n. 7. It is also abundantly clear that Time, Inc. v. 
Hill did not involve a performer, a person with a nil-me having 
commercial value, or any claim to a "right of publioity." This 
discrete kind of "appropriation" case was plamly jdentified in 
the literature cited by the Court 8 and had been adjudicated 
in the reported cases.0 
7 '·Thr law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion. of four 
different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common 
name, hut ot,herwise have almost nothing in common except t.hat each 
r~'prrsrnts au intrrference with the right of the plaintiff." Prosser, 
Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). Thus, according to Prosser, 
~orne cou rt,.; had recognized a cause of action for "intrusion" upon the 
plaintiff':; s.eclusion or solitudr ; public disclosure of "private facts" about. 
t lw pl11intiff's prn;onal life ; publicity that places the plaintiff in a "false 
light " in the public eye; and "appropria.tion" of the plaintiff's name or 
likene:;s for commercial purposes. One may be liable for "appropriation" 
If' he ''pirat(.>[s] the plaintifl"s identity for some advantage of his own." 
+8 Ca lif. L. Rev., at 403. 
8 See, for example, Prosser, Torts, 3rd Ed. 842 (1964); Blaustein, 
Privacy as an A::;pect of Human Dignity; An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 
~. Y. U . L. Rev. 962, 986-991 (1964); Kalven, Privacy in Tort L'tw-
Wrre Warren a.ud Brandeis Wrong?, 31 La.w and Contemporary Problems 
:~26, 331 ( 19(i6) . 
"E. g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp ., 229 F. 2d 481 
(CA3 1956); Sharkey v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. , 93 F. Supp. 986 
(~DNY 1950); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. 
~11pp. 490 ( 1938); Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Tmnsrculio 
Press Service, Inc., 165 Misc. 71, 30 N.Y. S. 159 (1937); Hogan v. A. S. 
/lames & Co .. 114 U. S. P. L. Q, 314 (Pa . Ct. C. P. 1957); Myers v. 
I} S. Camera Publishing Co.rp .. 167 N. Y . S. 2d 771, City Ct.. of Cit.y of 
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The differences between these two torts are important. 
First, the State's interests in providing a cause of action in 
each instance are different. "The interest protected" in per-
mitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light "is 
clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental 
'distress as in defamation." Prosser, supra, 48 Calif. L. Rev., 
at 400. By contrast, the State's interest in permitting a "right 
of publicity" is in protecting the proprietary interest of the 
individual in his act in part to encourage such entertain-
ment.10 As we later note, the State's interest is closely 
N. Y. (1957). The cases prior to 1961 are helpfully reviewed in Gordon, 
Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 
N. W. U. L. Rev. 553 (1960). 
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Cm·p., supra, involved a chal-
lenge to television exhibition of a film made of a prize fight that had 
occurred some time ago. Judge Biggs, writ.ing for the Court of Appea.Is, 
said at 229 F . 2d 486, 490: 
"There are, speaking very generally, two polar types of cases. One 
nrises when some accidental occurrence rends the veil of obscurity sur-
rounding an average person and makes him, arguable, newsworthy. The 
other type involves the appropriation of the performance or production 
of u. profeSsional performer or entrepreneur. Between the two extremes 
are many gradations, most involving strictly commercial exploitation of 
some aspect of an individual's personality, such as his name or picture. 
"The fact. is that, if a performer performs for hire, a curt~dlment., without 
consideration, of his right to control his performance is a. wrong to him. 
Such <t wrong vitally affects his livelihood, precisely as a trade libel, for 
example, affects the earnings of a corpora.tion. If the art.istry of the 
performance be used as a criterion, every judge perforce must tum 
himself into a literary, theatrical or sports critic." 
' 0 The Ohio Supreme Court expressed the view "that plaint.iff's claim 
i,.: one for invasion of the right of privacy by appropriation, and should 
he con;,;idered as such." 47 Ohio St., at 226, - N. E. 2d, at -. It 
•hould be noted, however, that the case before us is more limited than 
f.he broad cu.tegory of law:;uits that may arise under the heading of 
' 'appropriation.'' Petitioner doe:; not merely assert that some general use, 
~'IJ.Ch as ad.vecti:;in& was made oi his name or likeness; he relies on the 
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analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing 
on the tight of the individual to reap the reward of his 
endeavors and havmg little to do with protectiQg feelings or' 
reputation. Second, the two torts differ in the degree to 
which they intrude on dissemination of information to the 
public. In "false light" cases the only way to protect th~ 
interests involved is to a.ttempt to minimize publication of the 
damaging matter, while in "right of publicity" c~ the only 
question is who gets to do the publishing. An entertainer 
such as petitioner usually has no objection to the widespread 
publication of his act as long as he gets the commercial benefit 
of such publication. Indeed, in the present case petitioner 
did not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his act; he simply 
sought compensation for the broadcasf in the form of 
damages. 
Nor does it appear that our later cases, such as Rosenbloom 
v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U. S. 3~3 (1974); and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, t24 
U. S. 448 (1976); require or furnish substantial support for 
the Ohio court's privilege ruling. These cases, like New York 
Times, emphasize the protection extended to the press by the 
First Amendment in defamation cases, particularly when suit 
is brought by a public official or a public figure. N~ne of 
them involve an alleged appropriation by th~ press of a. right 
of publicity existing under state law. 
Moreover, Time, Inc. v. Hill, New York Times, Metromedia, 
Gertz, and Firestone all involved the reporting of events; in 
none of them was there an attempt to broadcast or pu ish 
an .... e~for which the performer ordinarily gets paid. It 
is evi ent, and there is no claim here to the contrary, that 
petitioner's state-law right of publicity would not serve to 
prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts about 
much narrower clajm that. respondent televised an entire act that he 
ordinarily gets paid to perform.. ::----
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petitioner's act.11 fi'rherever the line in particular situa.tions 
is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and 
those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they 
broadcast a performer's el!.yre ac~ without his conseng ·The 
Constitution uo more prevents a State from requiring respond-
ent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on 
television than it would privilege respondent to film and 
broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the 
copyright owner, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et. seq., cf. Kalem Co. v. 
Harpe1· Bros., 222 U. S. 55 (1911); Manners v. Morosco, 252 
U. S. :317 (1920), or to film and broadcast a prize fight, Ettore 
v. Philco 'Pelevision Broadcasting Corp., 229 F. 2d 481 (CA3 
1956). or a baseball game, Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV 
Broadcasti1~(! Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (WD Pa. 1938), where the 
promoters or the participants had other -plans for publicizing 
the event. There are ample reasons for reaching this 
conclusion. 
The broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a 
11 Pro~~er, Torts, 4t.h Ed. (1971), 806-807, generalizes on the cases: 
"Tiw ;.;<'w York (·uurt~ were faced very ea.rl~· with the obvious fact tha.t 
J\t>W~J>HJll'r:; and magazinl',;, to ~ay nothing of radio, television and motion 
picture,;, are by 110 UH-·au:; philant.hropie in:-;titutions, but are operated for 
profit. ..-\,., again::;t. the coutl'ntion that everything published by these 
agPneiP~ mu,.:( m·ee,;.~aril~- OE' ;for Jlltrpo,;r,.: of trade,' they were compelled 
to hold t-hat then· must be ::iOil1e clo::iel' and more direct connection, beyond 
the nwrr fact that rlw new,.,paJ)('r it:;elf i" ~<old; and that t.he presence of 
advrrt i,;ing ma Iter in adjacrnt coiLunn::;, or cwrn the duplica.t.ion of a news 
itrm for t.hr purpo~P of adve.rti;;ing the publication itself, does not ma.ke 
:lily ditl'rreneP. Au, - ot hrr conclu::;ion would in all probability have been 
an liii<'Oll~litutional iJJtPrf~·rpnc·e with llw frr<·dom of the press. Accord-
i ng]~ -. it ha,; be.t•u Jwld I hat the. nwre incidental mcnt.ion of t.he plain (,iff's 
ll:llrte in a book or a mul ion pieturc i::; not a.n iuvasion of hi~ privacy; nor 
J::i the publi<'atioa of a photograph or t~ new:-;recl in which he incidentally 
:tppear,;." (Foot nutt•,.. omined.) 
Co!lt [Ht r<· Awrrit·an La'" 1 n~l it-utt·, l{l•,;(atemenl of the Law Second, Ten ta-
ll\'!' Draft ~o . 2'2 , & li54c, Comnwnt. D. 
' . 
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s@§.tantial threat to the economic value of that performance. 
As the Ohio court recognized, this act is the product of peti-
tioner's own talents and energy, the end result of much time, 
effort and expense. Much of its economic value lies in the 
"right of exclusive control over the publicity given to his 
performance"; if the public can see the act for free on televi-
sion they will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair.' 2 The 
effect of a public broadcast of the performance is similar to 
preventing petitioner from charging an admission fee. "The ] 
rationale for [protecting the right of publicityk5 the straight-
forward. one of preventing unjust enrichme!!_t by the theft of 
good will. No social purpose is served by having the defend-
ant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have 
market value and for which he would norma.Uy pay." Kalven, 
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 
Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 331 (1966). More-
ovel', the broadcast of petitioner's entire performance, unlike 
the unauthorized use of another's 1~e for tne rposes of 
trade or the incidental use of a name or picture by the press, rgoes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an entertainer. Thus in this case, Ohio has recognized what may 
be the strongest case for a "right of publicity"-involving not 
the appropriation of au entertainer's reputa-tion to ephance 
the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropri~a 
tion of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his 
reputation in the first place. 
Of course, Ohio's decision to protect petitioner's right o 
publicity here •·ests on more than a desire to compensate the 
performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the 
nIt i~ po~sible, of course, that respondent's news broadcast increased 
the value of petitioner's performance by stimulating the public's interest 
in seeing the act live. In tim"(' circumstances, petitioner would not. be 
nble to prove dnmagl·s and tim~ would not recover. But petitioner has 
allrgrd that thr broadca~t mjured him to t.he extent of $25,000, App. 5, 
' tnd wr thmk t.he State should be allowed to compensate this injury if 
prawn. 
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protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the 
investment required to produce a performance of interest to 
the public. This same consideration underlies the patent and 
copyright laws long enforced by this Court. As the Court 
stated in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), 
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empower-
ing Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfa.re 
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science 
and · useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such cre-
ative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the 
services rendered." 
These laws perhaps regard the "reward to the owner as 
secondary consideration," United States v. Paramount Pic-
lures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948), but they were "intended 
definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights" in order to 
afford greater encouragement to the production of works of 
benefit to the public. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. 
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939). The Constitution does not 
prevent Ohio from making a similar choice here in deciding to 
protect the eutertainer's incentive in order to encourage the 
production of this type of work for public benefit. Cf. 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546 (1973); Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 476 (1974).1 ~ 
'" Goldstetn invoh·ed a California. sta.tute outlawing "record piracy"-the 
111111111 horizPd d11plication of recording::; of performances by major musical 
arti~t;,;. P!'titioncr::; thPrr launchPd a multifaceted constitutional attack 
on the :statutr, but they did uot argue that the statute violated the First 
Amendmc·nt. In rrjccti ng this broad-based con:stitutional attack, this: 
Court. concluded: 
'The Ca liforma statutor.' · ~:;cheme evidences a legi:slative policy to prohibit 
I apP piracy ' and 'rrcord Jlll'acy,' conduct that may adver::;ely affect. the-
<·outimH•d productiOn of npw recording:;, a largp indm;try in California. 
Arrntdi\Jgly, tbr State has, hy st<1 tute, given. to recordings the a.t.tributes; 
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There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, 
enjoys First Amendment protection. It is also true that 
e>ntertainment itself can be important news. Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, supra. But it is important to note that neither the 
public nor respondent will be deprived of the benefit of peti-
tioner's performance as long as his commercial stake in his 
act is appropriately recognized. Petitioner does not seek to 
c>njoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply wants to 
be paid for it. Nor do we think that a state-law damages 
remedy against respondent would represent a species of lia-
bility without fault contrary to the letter or spirit of Gertz, 
supra. Respondent knew exactly that petitioner objected to 
televising his act, but nevertheless displayed the entire film. 
We conclude, as have others/' that although the State of 
of property. No restmint has been p'laced on the use of an idea or 
concept; rather, petitioners and other individuals in precisely t.he same 
eompen:sation." Pember and Teeter, Privacy in the Press Since Time v. 
Hill, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 57,87 (1974). 
In Kewauee this Court upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's trade 
~ecret. Jaw, although again no First. Amendment clajm was presented. 
CJt.ing Goldstein. the Court stated: 
'' .Tust a:s the States may exercise regulatory power over writings so ma.y 
1he Stat('~ regula.te with re-spect to discoveries. States may hold diverse 
v1rwpoint:; in protrcting intrllPctual property relating to invention as they 
do in protecting the intellectual property relating to the subject matter 
of rop~-right . ThP only limitation on the States is tha.t in regulating the 
arra of patents nnd copyright.;; tlwy do not conflict with the operation of 
thr laws in this nrea pa.;;:;Pd by Congre::;s . ... " 416 U. S., at 479. 
Although recogr11zing that. the trade ;;ecret law resulted in preventing the 
publir gaining cPrtain information, the Court emphasized tha.t. the la,w 
hnd "a dPcidrdly bPneficial effect on society," id., at 485, and that without 
it, "organizrd ::;cirntific and trchnological research could become frag-
mented, nnd societ~· , as a whole, would suffer." I d., at 487. 
11 "There can be no offem;p to t.he Constitution if the [media] is eom-
lWlled to pay the fair va.luc of what. it has taken .... " Hill, Defamation 
and Privacy Und<'r the FirH1 Amendment, 76 Col. L. Rev. 1205, 1276 
( l97ti) " \Torr and more comt::; srem willing to acknowledge that plain-
tiff,.; who ,;up for appropriation de:serve damagrs not becau::;e they suffered 
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Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the 
circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not require it to do so. 
Reversed. 
8omc kind of severe mental di~tress but because the defendant. ·Used some-
thing which belonged to the plaintiff-his name or likeness-wit.hout. 
lllilnner and with the same personnel as appea.red on the original J ? 
recording. 
'' Until and unless CongN'ss takes further action with respect to record-
mgs ... , the California statute may be enforced against acts of piracy 
sueh as those which occurred in the present case." 412 U. S., at 571. 
(Emphasi~; added.) 
We note that federal district courts have rejected First Amendment, 
cha llenges to the federal copyright law on the ground that "no restraint 
has been phlCrd on the use of an idea or concept." United States v. 
Bodin, ~75 F . Supp. 1265, 1267 (SD OkhL. 1974). See also Walt Disney 
Productions v. Ail' Pirates. 345 F . Supp. 108, 115 (ND Cal. 1972) (citing 
Nimmer, Doe~; Copyright Abridge First Amendment . Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Pres~;, 17 U.S. L.A. L. Rev . 1180 (1970), arguing that. copy-
nght law doe:; not abridge the First Amendment because it does not 
restrain the communication of ideas or concepts); Robe1·t Stigwood G1'oup, 
Ud. v. O'Reilly , 346 F . Supp. 376 (Conn. 1972) (also .relying on Nimmer). 
Of cour:<e thi~; f':lti<' does not. make a claim that respondents would be 
pn'v<'nted by petitioner's "right of publicity" from staging or filming it~ 
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The Ohio Supreme Court held that respondent's telecast 
of the "human cannonball" was a privileged invasion of 
' petitioner's common law "right of publicity" because respondent's 
• 
actual intent was neither (a) to appropriate the benefit of the 
*-I 
publicity for a private use, nor (b) to injure petitioner.-
As I read the State court's explanation of the limtis 
on the concept of privilege, they define the substantive reach 
of a common law tort rather than anything I recognize as a limit 
on a federal constitutional right. The decision was unquestionably 
influenced by the Ohio court's proper sensitivity to First Amend-
ment principles, and to this Court's cases construing the First 
Amendment; indeed, I must confess that the opinion can be read as 
resting entirely on federal constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, 
the basis of the State court's action is sufficiently doubtful 
that I would remand the case to that court for clarification of 
its holding before deciding the federal constitutional issue. 
~/ Paragraph 3 of thecourt' s syllabus reads. as follows: 
"A TV station has a privilege to report in its news-
casts matters of legitimate public interest which 
would otherwise be protected by an individual's 
right of publicity, unless the actual intent of the 
TV station was to appropriate the benefit of the 
publicity for some non-privileged private use, or 
unless the actual intent was to injure the individual." 
In its opinion, the court described the "proper standard" in language 
which I read as defining the boundaries of a common law tort: 
"The proper standard must necessarily be whether the 
matters reported were of public interest, and if so, 
the press will be liable for appropriation of a per-
forme~\s r~ght of publ~c~ty only ~f ~ts ~ctual intent 
was not to report the performance, but rather, to 
appropriate the performance for some other 9rivate 
use, or if the actual intent was to injure the per-
former. It might also be the case that the press 
would be liable if it recklessly disregarded contract 
rights existing between the plaintiff and a third 
person to 9resent the performance to the public, but 
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No. 76-577 
Hugo Zacchini, Petitioner, l 
v. On Writ of Certiora.ri to the 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Supreme Court of Ohio. 
Company. 
[June -, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The Ohio Supreme Court held that respondent's telecast 
of the "human cannonball" was a privileged invasion of 
petitioner's common law "right of publicity" because re-
pondent's actual intent was neither (a) to appropriate the 
benefit of the publicity for a private use, nor (b) to injure 
petitioner.* 
As I read the state court's explanation of the limits on 
the concept of privilege, they define the substantive reach 
of a common law tort rather than anything I recognize as 
*Paragraph 3 of the court's syllabus reads as follows : 
"A TV ::;tation has a privilep;r to report in its newscasts matters of legiti-
mate pubEc interest which would otherwise be protected by an individ-
ual's right of publicity, unless the actual intrnt of the TV station was to 
appropriatr the benefit of the publicity for some non-privileged private 
use, or unless the actual intrnt was to injure the individual." 
In it::; opinion, the court dei:icribrd the "proper standard" in language which 
I read as defining the boundarie~ of a common law tort: 
"Thr proper standard must nece~sarily be whether the mat.ters reported 
wrn· of public interr::;t, and if ,;o, the prrss will be liable for appropriation 
of a. performer's right of publicity only if it s actual intent was not to re-
port the performance, but rnthrr, to appropriatr th<' performance for some 
(
A_ oth<).privat(' u~r. or if lhr adunl intent wa::; to injure the performer. It 
l..:.,rlnight abo br thr ca::;e that tlw prr:-;::; would be liable if it recklessly disre-
garded cont ract right ::; exi::;ting bet ween I hr plaintiff and a third person to 
prrsrm. the performance to thr public, but that qucst.ion is not presented 
here." 
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a limit on a federal constitutional right. The decision was 
unquestionably influenced by the Ohio court's proper sensi-
tivity to First Amendment principles, and to this Court's cases 
construing the First Amendment; indeed, I must confess that 
the opinion can be read as resting entirely on federal consti-
tutional grounds. Nevertheless, the basis of the state court's 
action is sufficiently doubtful that I would remand the case 
to that court for clarification of its holding before deciding 
the federal constitutional issue. 
dm/ss 6/14/77 
No. 76-577 ZACCHINI v. SCRIPPS-HOWARD 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Disclaiming any attempt to do much more than 
decide the narrow case before us, the Court reverses the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio based on repeated 
~iW~.~It. 
incantation of aAformula: "a performer's entire act." 
Its holding is summed up in one sentence: 
"Wherever the line in particular situations 
is to be drawn between media reports that are 
protected and those that are not, we are quite 
sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
do not immunize the media when they broadcast 
a performer's entire act without his consent." 
Ante, at 120 
q eea&t;±ffl Uhi!il Pii 1 I l'i!Qdenee that this 
formula provides a standard clear enough even for 
1 
resolution of this case. But in any event I 
believe the Court is insufficiently sensitive to the First 
Amendment values at stake, and I therefore dissent. 
Respondent used the film of petitioner's 
performance strictly as a routine part of its regular news 
program. Today's decision permitting recovery therefore 
casts a cloud over the daily editorial choices of every 
2. 
television news editor. Each time he receives film 
4}~~¢ ~ 
footage~~ a local fair, a circus, or even~ a 
,, ' ., ~:-~-
dramatic production made up of short one act F*•ys - to 
" 
offer only a few examples - he will have to take extra 
precautions to determine whether any of the segments might 
OU.,...rwi~e. , 
be held to portray a performer's entire act~~Ahe leavj( 
-he,(,.., i\,·"" 
the~station open to liability for substantial 
2 
damages. This is so even if he intends to use the 
footage only for a brief portion of a regular news 
program. €iveR tAe preBBY£9 e£ eeaeliAe&. ~ditors 
c: 
frequently will be unable to do adequate checking before 
show time, and consequently they often will choose not to 
run clearly newsworthy but chancy items. Or perhaps the 
, e. r • f't 0'\11\ 
station willAMentie~ the event, but it will confine itself 
to verbal presentatio~ccompanied perhaps by a still 
) 
picture. The public is then the loser. This is hardly 
r 
the ~~et news rep~age that the First Amendment is meant 
to foster. See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 u.s., 241, 257-258 (1974); Time, Inc. v. 
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254, 270-272, 279 (1964) ~ C.t. S~..H...\J . 
Ca_f;~.~~;-. __, '$"1 V. S. I'{~ ISO ·1~-y (Itt~) . 
These probable consequences reveal another 
problem with the Court's approac~ ;{t does not take 
3. 
adequate account of the unique requirements of this 
e 3 
particular medium, teljvision news programs. Such 
programs exist largely to bring movie footage to the 
viewers - to present the news of the day with an immediacy 
and 
considered his act a newsworthy event. 
~ae l!noad latitude 'ee 8eei8e ubat manner e£ eet~era~e it 




was hardly a surprise tha~a television statio~ chose 
~s~~ 
to report eA 'k' event by means of film coverage. Given 
A 
this choice, meaningful presentation practically required 
a film clip of the length employed here, and the station 
simply is not responsible for the fact that petitioner's 
happens to last only 15 seconds. The Court's 
~s t I \M. ~" :"' -+i..A.:e. c.: ,-c WII\S ~ ~ ~ ~"''• 
decision promotes liability rules that ine~itably tend to 
t'&po"t~ 
c. ko-.rD- c.~ r: s+.' t..,.. ~-t'Qcl 
deprive this medium of itsAftfttPral a~preach siiLRl 
~ ue• J'i - whenever the subject of the news reporting is a 
short performance. 
The First Amendment stands guard against this 
kind of ~nfinement of a news medium, and I am convinced 
that it commands a different analytical starting point 
from the one selected by the Court. Rather than begin 
4. 
with a quantitative analysis of the performer's behavior -
is this or is this not his entire act? - we should direct 
initial attention to the actions of the news media: what 
use did the station make of the film footage? When a film 
is used, as here, for a routine portion of a regular news 
program, I would hold that the First Amendment protects 
the station from a "right of publicity" or "appropriation" 
4 
suit, absent a truly extraordinary showing by the 
plaintiff that the news broadcast was a sub~erfuge 
'-' 
5 
permitting private or commercial exploitation. 
Since the film clip here was undeniably treated as news 
and since there is no claim that the news use was 
subterfuge, respondent's action were constitutionally 
protectet;) r ... respectfpl 1.y di •sent. 
6/14/77 Zacchini footnotes 
N-1 
l. I have never witnessed a human cannonball 
performance, and the record does not supply a sufficiently 
detailed description to know for sure, but I would be 
surprised if the "act" commences only with the explosion 
that launches petitioner on his wa~ending with the 
landing in the net a few seconds later. I would guess 
there is some fanfare, probably stretched over as many 
minutes as possible, to heighten the audience's 
anticipation: introduction of the performer, last-minute 
checking of the apparatus, suiting up, and lastly entry 
into the cannon, all accompanied by suitably ominous 
commentary from the master of ceremonies. If this is 
found to be the case on remand, then respondent could not 
be said to have appropriated the "entire act" in its 
15-second newsclip - and the Court's opinion then would 
afford no guidance whatever for resolution of the case. 
Moreover, in future cases involving other kinds of 
performances, I would expect similar difficulties in 
determining just what constitutes the "entire acJ[} 
2. At some points the Court seems to acknowledge 
' L r:: s ""'-s' 
of publicityAr~e~ that the cause of action~  a right 
-+o fl("t:.Je-k 
~~-~8 aheaq t!:hee unjust enr ichmentG}: s e:Ae~re8y !'r~-:eRees~ 
N-2 
See,~-~·' ante, at 13. But the remainder of the opinion 
s 
inconsistently accepts a measure of damag~based not on 
the defendant's enhanced profits but on harm to the 
plaintiff regardless of any gain to the defendant. See, 
~-~., ante, at 13, n. 12. Indeed, in this case there is 
no suggestion whatever that respondent television station 
gained a single penny based on the showing of petitioner's 
flight (although it no doubt received its normal 
advertising revenue for the news program - revenue it 
y\0 ~ .. ,... c4l...:.cl... 
would have received Are~a!!elle~~ o£ lih~e news i terns 
appeared). Nevertheless, in the unlikely event that 
petitioner can prove that his income was somehow reduced 
as a result of the broadcast, respondent will apparently 
t 
have to compensate him for ~ difference. 
3. In another important First Amendment case 
arising in a somewhat different context, the Court was 
careful to note: 
"Nor does it follow that motion pictures are 
necessarily subject to the precise rules 
governing any other particular method of 
expression. Each method tends to present its 
own peculiar problems." Joseph Burst*n, Inc. v. 
Wilson, 343 u.s. 495, 503 (1952) (emp asis 
added). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 
395 u.s. 367, 386-387 (1969). 
-:Bv..~ ""-v ,·~ 
~ ~.Q.. .. pJGl:c..) 
·,"' VVVof v.· t.w k 
N-3 
when a suit is based instead on "intrusion" or publication 
of "private details." See ante, at 9: Prosser, Privacy, 
48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960). Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 u.s. 323 (1974) (clarifying the different 
standards required in defamation suits, depending on 
whether or not the plaintiff is a public figure(.U In an 
'\b. -+t..t. ~ lo.&~e. ~$ ~ 
"appropriation" or "right of publicity" suitA the 
plaintiff IJ£ ' !all) does not complain about the fact of 
publication, but rather about its timing or manner. He 
seeks to retain control over these aspects in order to 
keep the monetary benefits that flow from such 
N>~II-U) O.tM\~t~ G4\l\S i~~ 
wat"-~ ~rc4 publication. 
~
In the other causes of action, the plaintiff 
" 
~~""~~ ot f'O~N. generally seeks to avoid any sort of public exposure. 
~~ r~ror~ . ~s ~ 
~Athe suit is for "intrusion" or publication of 
"private details91 the existence of constitutional 
privilege is much less likely to turn on whether the media 
used the information in a news broadcast or in some other 
.;..,~••est" 
fashion~ ~s~i~R~e~e~e~~~.e~~~~l~ani~t~t l~t~' £~f~' ••-A~J~i~g~s._ii~n~~~r~e~o~e~R~e~i~ft~~~a~~~ 
hF~· 
Bt! ~ I simply ilOLE e8e ~9e9Aeial giffiliHlA8@8 
are express Re e~inien Oil the proper et!esemg in iiWQA a 
-ease . 
5. Perhaps this is not far different from the 
standard employed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in its 
N-4 
CAS~ 
holding quoted ante, at 3. But thisAdoes not require any 
detailed specification of when liability may be imposed 
despite ostensible news use, since there is no claim here 
that the news use was anything but bona fide. I would 
emphasize, however, that selling time during a news 
0\,viov~(y 
broadcast to advertisers in the customary fashion~does not 
make for 'bommercial exploitation'\ in the sense intended 
here. See Prosser, Torts 806-807 (4th ed. 1971). Cf. New 
York Times v. Sullivan, supra, at 266. 
'-
..§u:prmtt <!fourt of tlrt ~nitt~ ..§taUs 
';Was!ringhm. lfl. <!f. 2.ll,?J!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE J 
June 17, 1977 
Re: 76-577 - Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co. 
Dear Byron: 
I join. If the longhand note on the attached 
copy of page 7 interests you, I grant you the 
right to copy my entire "performance" sans 
royalties. egards,GJ 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
dm/ss 6/l'C/77 
No. 76-577 ZACCHINI v. SCRIPPS-HOWARD 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Disclaiming any attempt to do much more than 
d e cide the narrow case before us, the Court reverses th'e 
d ec ision of the Supreme Court of Ohio based on r e peated 
5;~~1e. 
incantation of aAformula: "a performer's entire act." 
Its holding is summ e d up in one sentence: 
"Wherever the line in particular situations 
is to be drawn between media reports that are 
protected and those that are not, we are quite 
sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
do not immunize the media when they broadcast 
a performer's entire act without his consent." 
Ante, at 120 
formula provides a standard clear enough even for 
1 
resolution of this case. But in any event I 
believe the Court is insufficiently sensitive to the First 
Amendment values at stake, and I therefore dissent. 
Respondent used the film<S.tpet±tion~ 
. . -- ~ 
performance str ictl'Sr-a.s._ a routine part_ of · its regular news 
·----
- ~- ---. . --C . 
program. Today's decisioi permittirig re~overy_ therefore 
~,..... ---....__ ~~-
~ -- --~~ ,....,-,..,. --...._ 
casts a~otid_ . .?v,er ~the daily editorial choices _ot: __ ~~~ry --
/ 
-2-
Although the Court lumps the cases together, ante, at 
12, ~~B respondent's action here is by no means comparable 
to an unconsented D(: commercial broadcast of a ~ prize 
fight or a baseball game, wherein the broadcaster keeps 
the profits and refuses to share them with the performers. 
There is no suggestion here that respondent made any such 
special use of the film. Instead, it simply reported on 
what petitioner concedes to be a newsworthy event, in a 
way hardly surprising for a television station -- by 
means of film coverage. The report was an ordinary part 




It is the purest example of the press fulfilling the 
~+~lovteL 
informing func tionl\ en;~;r.isage6 for it ~p in our First 
Amendment system of free expression. 
kcfel:~ 
~~-rhe Courts~~ that the station's ordinary 
A 
news report may give rise to substantial liabilit~as 
disturbing implications, for the decision will~ inevitably 
• 
lead to a 1 degree of media self-censorship. Cf. Smith v. 
t. 
California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-154 (1959). Wh:n~er a 
~ 
television news editor is unsure whethr ~~film footage 
{Q.C.f2iv~ ~c....~~ 3./ 
he hasA might be held to portray an "entire act, "..,;;:.1 
he is now encouraged to decline coverage--even of clearly 
--fk br-o~CA~t 
newsworthy events--or else to confineAh±msel~ to watered-
down verbal reporting, perhaps with an occasional still 
picture. The public is then the loser. This is hardly 
the kind of robust news reportage that the First Amendment 
is meant to foster. See generally Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-258 (1974); Time, Inc. -
v. ~' 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-272, 279 (1964). ---. . 
In my view the~ First Amendment commands a different 
~ analytical starting point from the one selected 
by the Court. Rather than begin 
- ¥-
with a quanti~ative analysis of the performer's behavior -
1s this or is this not his entire act? - we should direct 
initial attention to the actions of the news media: what 
use did the station make of the film footage? When a film 
is used, as here, for a routine portion of a regular news 
program, I would hold that the First Amendment protects 
the station from a "right of publicity" or "appropriation" 
• suit, absent a truly extraordinary snowing by the 
plaintiff that the news broadcast was a sub~erfuge 
'--' 






I emphasize that this is an "appropriation" suit, 
rather than one of the other varietees of ~l\X ~fright 
of privacy" tort suits delineated by Dean Prosser in his 
classic article. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 
~ c.o ti 'l:i-\;; ; ""+e ~~. ~ a.v--t. c.cv.s M.u ll>lr. ,t.· f¥ c.r e.4": 
383 (1960). In those other causes of action~fhe plaintiff 
generally seeks to avoid any sort of public exposure, and 
tS 
the existence of constitutional privilege ~Atherefore 
~ieaxx±ikei~a¥~ess likay to turn on whether the 
publication occurred in a news broadcast or in some other 
fashion. In a suit like the one before us, however, the 
exposure to tre public, 
plaintiff does not complain about the fact of/kx~Mkli«aki8n 
but rather about its timing or manner. He seeks to 
retain control over those aspects in order to keep the 
monetary ~ benefits that flow from such publication. But 
in essence, 
hav~ng made the matter public -- having chosen,/kkakxix~ 
to make it newsworthy -- he cannot,consistently with 
the First Amendment, complain of routine news reportage. 
Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) 
(clarifying the diffennt liability standards appropriate 
in defamation suits, depending on whether or not the 
plaintiff is a public figure). 
Since the film • clip here was undeniably treated as 
news and since there is no claim that the news use was 
subterfuge, respondent's actions were constitutionally 
~privileged. I would affirm. 
6/14/77 Zacchini footnotes 
N-1 · 
1. I have never witnessed a human cannonball 
performance, and the record does not supply a sufficiently 
detailed description to know for sure, but I would be 
surprised if the "act" commences only with the explosion 
that launches petitioner on his wa~ending with the 
landing in the net a few seconds later. I would guess 
there is some fanfare, probably stretched over as many 
minutes as possible, to heighten the :audience's 
anticipation: introduction of the performer, last-minute 
checking of the apparatus, suiting up, and lastly entry 
into the cannon, all accompanied by suitably ominous 
commentary from the master of ceremonies. If this is 
found to be the case on remand, then respondent could not 
be said to have appropriated the "entire act" in its 
15-second newsclip- and the Court's opinion then would 
afford no guidance whatever for resolution of the case. 
Moreover, in future cases involving other kinds of 
performances, I would expect similar difficulties in 
determining just what constitutes the "entire actf.& 
2. At some points the Court seems to acknowledge 




~ k~~ ;s kr.-r 
of action~~ a right of publicityArest~ ~ 
unjust enrichment~c thereby-pfevente~ 
N-2 
See,~-~., ante, at 13. But the remainder of the opinion 
s 
inconsistently' accepts- a measure of darriageJ based not on 
the defendant's enhanced profits but on harm to the 
plaintiff regardless of any gain to the defendant. See, 
~-~., ~nte , at 13, n. 12. Indeed, in this case there is 
no suggestion whatever that respondent television station 
gained a single penny based on the showing of petitioner's 
flight (although it no doubt received its normal 
advertising revenue for the news progTam - revenue it 
V\0 v-Jf e r- w{__; d._ 
would have receivedA~~~l~-of-wh~t news items 
appeared). Nevertheless, in the unlikely event that 
petitioner can prove that his income was somehow reduced 
as a result of the broadcast, respondent will apparently 
-t 
have to compensate him for~ difference. 
. I~mportant First Amendment case 
ari/g inyomewhat di 2rent conte~t was 
ar 0 note: 
3. Such doubts might arise when the editor receives 
film footage f of an event at a local fair, a circus, 
or a dramatic production made up of short xk skits, to 
offer only a few examples. 
4. ~a This case does not require any detailed 
~ "So~S ~ ..¢e~ \~:~;~ 4. 
specification ofA~R~~~i~4~~-may-be-i~pose~s~~~ 
sv-1~J 
e-s-t:ensi.bire -ew ~ sinc,there is no claim here that 
responsent's news use was~ anything but bona fide. 
I would point out, however, that selling time during a 
news broadcast to advertisers in tre customary fashion 
obviously does not make for "commercial exploitation" 
in the sense intended here. See Prosser, Torts 806-807 
(4th ed. 1971). Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 
at 266. 
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No. 76-577 ZACCHINI v. SCRIPPS-HOWARD 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Disclaiming any attempt to do more than decide the 
narrow case before us, the Court reverses the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio based on repeated incantation of 
a single formula :"a performer's entire act." The holding 
today is summed up in one sentence: 
"Wherever the line in particular situations 
is to be drawn between media reports that are 
protected and those that are not, we are quite 
sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
do not immunize the media when they broadcast 
a performer's entire act without his consent." 
Ante, at 12. 
I doubt that this formula provides a standard clear enough 
1 
even for resolution of this case. In any event, I am not 
persuaded that the Court's opinion is appropriately sensitive 




Although the Court would draw no distinction, ante, 
at 12, I do not view respondent's action as comparable to 
unauthorized commercial broadcasts of sporting events, 
theatrical performances, and the like where the broad-
caster keeps the profits. There is no suggestion 
here that respondent made any such use of the film. Instead, 
it simply reported on what petitioner concedes to be a 
newsworthy event, in a way hardly surprising for a television 
station - by means of film coverage. The report was part 
of an ordinary daily news program, consuming a total of 15 
seconds. It is a routine example of the press fulfilling 
the informing function so vital to our system. 
The Court's holding that the station's ordinary news 
report may give rise to substantial liability has disturbing 
2 
implications, for the decision could lead to a degree of 
media self-censorship. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 
147, 150-154 (1959). Hereafter, whenever a television news 
editor is unsure whether certain film footage he has received 
3 
from a camera crew might be held to portray an "entire act," 
he may decline coverage - even of clearly newsworthy events -
or confine the broadcast to watered-down verbal reporting, 
perhaps with an occasional still picture. The public is 
then the loser. This is hardly the kind of news reportage 




Miami Herald Publishing Co . v. Tornillo, 418 U.S . 241, 257-
258 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-272, 279 
(1964). 
In my view the First Amendment commands a different 
analytical starting point from the one selected by the Court. 
Rather than begin with a quantitative analysis of the 
performer's behavior - is this or is this not his entire 
act? - we should direct initial attention to the actions 
of the news media: what use did the station make of the 
film footage? When a film is used, as here, for a routine 
portion of a regular news program, I would hold that the 
First Amendment protects the station from a "right of 
publicity" or "appropriation" suit, absent a strong showing 
by the plaintiff that the news broadcast was a subterfuge 
4 
or cover for private or commercial exploitation. 
I emphasize that this is an "appropriation" suit, 
rather than one of the other vatieties of "right of privacy" 
tort suits delineated by Dean Prosser in his classic 
article. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960). 
other 
In those/causes of action the competing interests are 
considerably different. The plaintiff generally seeks 
to avoid any sort of public exposure, and the existence 
of constitutional privilege is therefore less likely to 
4. 
turn on whether the publication occurred in a news broad-
cast or in some other fashion. In a suit like the one 
before us, however, the plaintiff does not complain about 
the fact of exposure to the public, but rather about its 
timing or manner. He welcomes some publicity, but seeks to 
retain control over means and manner as a way to maximize 
for himself the monetary benefits that flow from such 
publication. But having made the matter public - having 
chosen, in essence, to make it newsworthy - he cannot, 
consistently with the First Amendment, complain of routine 
news reportage. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323 (1974) (clarifying the different liability standards 
appropriate in defamation suits, depending on whether, or 
not the plaintiff is a public figure). 
Since the film clip here was undeniably treated as 
news and since there is no claim that the news use was 
subterfuge, respondent's actions were constitutionally 




1. Although the record is not explicit,it is unlikely 
that the "act" commenced abruptly with the explosion that 
launched petitioner on his way, ending with the landing 
in the net a few seconds later. One may assume that the 
actual firing ' was preceded by some fanfare, possibly 
stretching over several minutes, to heighten the audience's 
anticipation : introduction of the performer, description 
of the uniqueness and danger, last-minute checking of the 
apparatus, ,and entry into the cannon, all accompanied by 
suitably ominous commentary from the master of ceremonies. 
If this·'.is found to be the case on remand, then respondent 
could not be said to have appropriated the "entire act" 
in its 15-second newsclip - and the Court's opinion then 
would afford no guidance for resolution of the case. 
Moreover, in future cases involving different performances, 
similar difficulties in determining just what constitutes 
the "entire act" are inevitable. 
2 . At some points the Court seems to acknowledge 
that the reason for recognizing a cause of action asserting 
a "right of publicity" is to prevent unjust enrichment. 
See, ~·&·, ante, at 13. But the remainder of the opinion 
inconsistently accepts a measure of damages based not on 
the defendant's enhanced profits but on harm to the 
plaintiff regardless of any gain to the defendant. See, 
~.g., ante, at 13, n.l2. Indeed, in this case there is 
N-2 
no suggestion that respondent television station gained 
financially by showing petitioner's flight (although it no 
doubt received its normal advertising revenue for the 
news program - revenue it would have received no matter 
which news items appeared). Nevertheless, in the unlikely 
event that petitioner can prove that his income was somehow 
reduced as a result of the broadcast, respondent will 
apparently have to compensate him for the difference. 
3 o Such doubts are especially likely to arise when 
the editor receives film footage of an event at a local 
fair, a circus, a sports competition of limited duration 
(e.g., the winning effort in a ski-jump competition), 
or a dramatic production made up of short skits, to 
offer only a few examples. 
4. This case requires no detailed specification of 
the standards for identifying a subterfuge, since there is no 
claim here that respondent's news use was anything but 
bona fide. Cf. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, ___ , N.E.2d 
___ (the standards suggested by the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
quoted ante, at 3). I would point out, however, that selling 
time during a news broadcast to advertisers in the customary 
fashion does not make for "commercial exploitation" in the 
sense intended here. See Prosser, Torts 806-807 (4th ed. 
197l)o Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 266. 
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